War Makes the Regime:Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide by Eibl, Max Ferdinand et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Eibl, M. F., Hertog, S., & Slater, D. (Accepted/In press). War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and
Political Militarization Worldwide. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
1 
 
War Makes the Regime: 
Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide 
 
Abstract: War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This essay brings the 
growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older 
research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. We offer 
a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to 
give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While the argument was initially 
developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by 
furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches 
in the coup and civil-military literatures. In support of our argument, quantitative tests 
confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization both more likely and 
more enduring, not simply in a single region, but more generally. 
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In February 1989, a group of military officers presented Sudanese Prime Minister 
Sadiq Al-Mahdi with an ultimatum: either give the military the means to achieve a 
battlefield victory against the secessionist regional rebellion in Sudan’s south or end 
the conflict by political settlement.  He was unable to do either. Four months later, he 
was ousted in a bloodless coup led by Brigadier Omar Al-Bashir (NYT 1989). The 
coup ushered in a military regime which has lasted 30 years and continues, despite 
Bashir’s ouster in April 2019 in the face of popular mass mobilization.  
The Sudanese case conforms to the central argument we make in this paper. 
Regional rebellions – where rebels seek separation or autonomy from the political 
center, not its conquest – are associated with transitions to militarized regimes. 
Building on Slater (2010, 2018), this paper furnishes a deductively grounded theory 
for this association between a distinctive type of war – regional rebellions – and one 
particular type of authoritarian regime: militarized regimes. To explain the link, we 
emphasize two causal mechanisms: disalignment of preferences between civilian and 
military leaders and the military’s autonomous operational experience in fighting 
regional wars.  
When subjecting this macro-association to empirical tests on a global dataset, 
we find strong empirical support for our argument that regional rebellions stand out 
among all forms of war in making militarization more likely and more enduring. 
Regional rebellions double the likelihood of the subsequent emergence of a military 
regime; and military regimes that experience a regional rebellion during their spell are 
45 percent less likely to democratize. We also provide illustrative qualitative examples 
of our mechanisms in Asian and African cases of regime militarization. Taken 
together, this study establishes regional wars as a key causal variable for explaining 
the emergence and durability of one specific type of authoritarian regime.  
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We make several theoretical contributions. While the authoritarianism 
literature has made great strides in explaining the effects of different regime types on 
various outcomes (e.g. Chandra and Rudra 2015; Weeks 2012), scholars are still to 
systematically consider why different types of authoritarian regimes emerge in the first 
place. The literature on war, conversely, has predominantly sought to explain war 
occurrence, while war as a producer of political outcomes other than state formation 
(e.g. Tilly 1985; Thies 2004) has been neglected.  
This paper brings together these disjoint literatures and establishes war as an 
independent variable for regime type outcomes. The study also refines the literature 
on civil-military relations and coups, which has exhibited a tendency to lump together 
domestic conflicts of all kinds as determinants of military interventions, invoking 
concepts such as “mass, organized, and politically violent opposition” (Svolik 2013, 
767), “civil conflict” (Piplani and Talmadge 2015), or “instability” (Leon 2014, 382). 
Our argument conceptually separates armed from unarmed domestic conflicts and, 
among armed conflicts, argues that only one specific type – regional rebellions – 
increases the likelihood of militarized regimes. More generally, our conceptual 
emphasis on militarization – a term we derive from seminal texts on civil-military 
relations – highlights the possibility of military rule through means other than coups.  
In the following sections, we outline how this paper relates to the coup 
literature, define the concept of militarization, and remark upon the surprising dearth 
of literature connecting types of war to types of political regimes. We then present our 
theoretical argument building and expanding on Slater (2010, 2018), elaborating on 
the main causal mechanisms with the help of illustrative case evidence. Our 
quantitative analysis then tests the argument’s generalizability to the global population 
of countries. We conclude with a reflection on the broader relevance of our findings. 
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Coups and Militarization 
Recent literature on coups has made significant strides in explaining the motivations 
of militaries to seize power, highlighting structural factors such as slow growth or 
lagging human development and window-of-opportunity events (e.g. weak electoral 
performance) as determinants (e.g. Hiroi and Omori 2013; Wig and Rod 2014). 
Military involvement in politics in this line of inquiry boils down to a singular event 
– the coup – commonly defined as an “illegal attempt […] to unseat the sitting 
executive” (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). 
While such a dichotomous conceptualization offers clear measurement 
advantages (Feaver 1999, 219), “coup-ism” problematically defines the most extreme 
event as the conceptual benchmark while neglecting other ways militaries exert 
political power (Croissant et al. 2010). The absence of a coup is not necessarily a sign 
of successful civilian control; rather, it may indicate that a politically powerful military 
has been granted influence and prerogatives ex ante, rendering a coup unnecessary 
(Feaver 1999, 218). Coups also frequently involve one military faction overthrowing 
another, rather than displacement of civilian by military power (Geddes, Frantz, and 
Wright 2014).  
In contrast, foundational texts on civil-military relations called attention to the 
different degrees to which regimes can be militarized, that is, the extent to which the 
military exerts political power in an ongoing fashion. Finer’s (1962) seminal study 
distinguishes four levels of military involvement, ranging from mere “displacement” 
of critical with pliant civilian leaders, to full-blown “supplantment” of civilian 
leadership through direct military takeover. Similarly, Stepan (1988) highlights a 
range of institutionalized prerogatives of Latin American militaries. As Brooks (2019) 
reminds us, civilian authority or, in Huntington’s (1957) terms, “objective control” of 
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the military by civilian leaders can be compromised without coups. We recover this 
concept of militarization here. 
Following this literature, militarization means that key decision-making power 
over policies unrelated to national security is usurped by the military. As a result, 
militarization necessarily entails an autocratic form of government as unelected 
military officials decide major non-military policies. How militaries exert power has 
taken different institutional shapes (e.g. high-powered national security councils, 
military juntas, key ministerial portfolios occupied by military officers), and the 
degree to which militarized autocracies have used political institutions (e.g. parties, 
parliaments) and allowed political participation has been equally variable.1 
To make this empirical variation analytically manageable, we build on Finer’s 
(1962, 4) concepts of “displacement” and “supplantment” and propose a 
corresponding distinction between two broad variants of militarization: direct and 
indirect. Militarization is direct when the chief executive is an active-duty officer,2 
who is often but not necessarily backed up by an institutionalized military decision-
making body (e.g. a junta); it is indirect when a civilian leads the executive and the 
military wields political power from the background, for instance through a national 
 
1 This distinguishes our concept from the notion of praetorian regimes which Huntington (1968, 78-82) 
defines as necessarily under-institutionalized and which, understood as being at an intermediate stage 
of a linear modernization process, are consequently prone to instability and rupture. Some but by no 
means all militarized regimes can be praetorian. 
2 This does not include former soldiers who won in competitive, multi-party elections. 
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security council “advising” the government. Both types can be described as militarized 
regimes.3  
Alternative conceptualizations of “military-led autocracies” (e.g. Geddes, 
Frantz, and Wright 2014) do not encompass indirect military rule behind a civilian 
executive, although such indirect militarization is frequently observed.4 For instance, 
the 1957 constitution of Honduras granted the military expansive powers to influence 
state spending and policies (Ruhl 1996). Similarly, the National Security Council in 
Turkey historically allowed the military to influence, and if necessary force to 
abdicate, civilian governments (Narli 2000). The Pakistani military undermined the 
power of post-Zia civilian governments to exercise authority over key state personnel 
and policies (Shah 2014, 168). By using the concept of militarization, and 
distinguishing direct and indirect variants, we capture the fact that militaries can wield 
political power without supplanting civilian governments.  
While regime militarization often begins with a coup, a coup does not always 
commence regime militarization. Coups can initiate democratic transitions (e.g. 
Marinov and Goemans 2014) or represent a military effort to replace one set of civilian 
leaders with another. Conversely, regime militarization may involve a gradual military 
effort to acquire power and exert it indirectly, or situations in which overburdened 
civilian rulers hand over control to militaries. Different from coups, regime 
militarization is (to varying degrees) an enduring feature of political systems. It shifts 
 
3 To avoid a disconnect from the large literature on military regimes, we use the term “military regime” 
and “militarized regime” interchangeably to designate both direct and indirect military rule.  
4 Their variations of military-led autocracies (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014, 152) all imply an officer 
as head of the executive.  
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our focus to the question of how and why militaries secure and sustain political power 
over long periods of time. 
 
The Paucity of Theory on Wars and Regimes 
Most empirical research on wars has sought to explain their occurrence. But what 
about the political effects of war? As Kasza (1996, 370) noted nearly a quarter century 
ago: “every aspect of domestic politics has felt war’s influence. It is time […] to give 
this pivotal phenomenon the attention it deserves.” Yet our relative inattention to war 
as a determinant of politics persists. This is particularly true for the most studied 
macro-level outcome of all besides war itself: democratic and authoritarian regimes. 
Instead, scholars have mostly analyzed the effects of interstate and, more 
recently, intrastate war on state formation (e.g. Thies 2004). The nexus between war 
and regime formation has received much less interest. Ertman’s (1997) study is a 
telling example. Unlike most bellicist works, Ertman strives to explain both states and 
regimes in European political development. Yet war only helps explain states in 
Ertman’s theory. To explain the rise of constitutionalist regimes, Ertman relies on a 
non-bellicist variable: the territorial vs. status basis of medieval representative 
assemblies. 
When bellicist theory does discuss regime effects, findings have been 
inconsistent. Some literature points to the democratizing force of external war as it 
leads to elite-level negotiations over taxes and state-building (North and Weingast 
1989; Tilly 1992). By contrast, Downing (1993) argues that the military revolution in 
early modern Europe pressed monarchs to disregard and disband parliaments. Beyond 
elite bargaining models, recent research suggests that high levels of popular 
mobilization during civil war can foster democratic inclusion after an armistice 
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(Huang 2017). Contrarily, invocations of “garrison states” (Lasswell 1941) imply that 
wars have authoritarian effects. Some authors argue that participation or military 
defeat in inter-state war make regime breakdown through a military coup more likely 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1992; Finer 1962). Others have shown that inter-state war 
diminishes the likelihood of military overthrows (e.g. Piplani and Talmadge 2015). 
Desch (2001) and Staniland (2008) report that intra-state conflict makes coups more 
likely. Bell and Sudduth (2017) argue that the risk of coups increases as a result of the 
costs imposed on combatants. Our analysis builds on their welcome shift in focus 
towards internal warfare, while more precisely specifying the type of civil war most 
likely to trigger this dynamic. 
In summary, the war literature has devoted little sustained interest to regime 
formation. Even where it has done so, it has characteristically approached regimes as 
a dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism. This is insufficient in light of 
the institutional diversity across authoritarian regimes that comparative research 
during the last two decades has established. The key distinction to emerge from this 
new wave of research is the contrast between authoritarian regimes in which power 
rests in a ruling party and those in which it rests in the military – a recurrent variation 
which remains to be systematically explained. Building on Slater’s (2018) recent 
work, this essay argues that a productive way to tackle this puzzle is by focusing on 
the gap in the literature on the macro-level political consequences of war. 
 
War and Regime Militarization: Towards Micro-Foundations 
The argument we test in this article is rooted in Cold War Southeast Asia (Slater 2010, 
2018). Although virtually all Southeast Asian countries experienced severe internal 
warfare after World War II, they differed sharply in the predominant type of conflict. 
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Some newly born countries confronted armed challenges from groups seeking to 
escape the newly formed state, while others faced rebels aiming to seize the new 
capital. This difference was significant because, if violent conflict is to spark political 
development, it must unify a set of actors with sufficient resources to craft a new 
political order: either through revolutionary takeover or counterrevolutionary self-
defense. Southeast Asia’s experience with divergent forms of rebellion suggests that 
regional rebellions are the least likely type to inspire a cohesive counterrevolutionary 
coalition encompassing both military and civilian leaders.5  
Our core purpose in this section is to decontextualize Slater’s original theory 
and parlay the existing, inductively generated findings into a more deductively 
grounded theory inspired by rational-actor approaches. This results in refined and 
generalizable micro-foundations for the causal link between regional rebellions and 
militarization. We thereby embed the theory in literatures on coups and civil-military 
relations, specifically their emphasis on information asymmetries and strategic 
assessment, coordination problems, and corporate grievances.  
We first elaborate a theory of two general mechanisms to explain the link 
between regional rebellions and regime militarization. We then present illustrative 
evidence from a variety of cases (starting in Southeast Asia) to elucidate how the 
stipulated mechanisms might work in practice. Our case material builds on a 
convenience sample and is only meant to serve as empirical illustrations, not a 
systematic test, of the mechanisms. As the causal mechanisms go beyond Slater 
(2018), the empirical material used to illustrate the mechanisms is new, although 
 
5 For the argument and further evidence that leftist, center-seeking rebellions spawned durable and 
civilianized authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, see Slater (2010, 2018) and Slater and Smith 
(2016).  
10 
 
drawn from some of the same cases. The main point of this section is to theoretically 
motivate our general expectation that regional wars are more likely to lead to 
militarization – the core hypothesis and empirical focus of this paper. A dedicated test 
of the causal mechanisms and their observable implications is beyond the scope of this 
current work. 
We highlight two mechanisms – what we call the disalignment and the 
operations mechanism – through which the causal connection between regional 
rebellions and political militarization can unfold. These two mechanisms are 
conceptually separate and can occur independently of each other, although it is 
conceivable that they influence each other in specific cases. Although these 
mechanisms are not necessarily exhaustive, we consider them the most systematic 
ways in which regional rebellions shape regimes.  
 
Disalignment 
When war reshapes states and regimes, it does so by reshaping political coalitions. Of 
particular interest for our argument here, political militarization requires a political 
disalignment in which militaries become both divorced from and more distrustful of 
civilian leadership. The civil-military literature posits that militaries can reject the 
legitimacy of specific missions or develop divergent views about how and when to use 
force (Betts 1991; Feaver and Gelpi 2011).  
We argue that regional rebellions are an especially likely candidate to disalign 
civilian and military elites in this fashion. Specifically, regional rebellions entail 
especially severe information asymmetries and hence prompt civilian and military 
leaders to develop divergent beliefs about the threat environment the regime is facing 
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and how this threat should be countered.6 This can heighten the military leadership’s 
corporate grievances, which are key motivations for military interventions (Nordlinger 
1977; Thompson 1980).  
Mostly huddled in major cities, civilian elites are predominantly focused on 
political activities and threats originating in and around the capital and other major 
population centers (Bates 1981; Waldner, Peterson, and Shoup 2017). What is more, 
given that taking rebellions into urban political centers is costly (Kalyvas 2006, 133) 
and the credibility of a signal increases with its costs, civilian elites should perceive 
rebel activity close to these centers, rather than far away from them, as highly 
threatening (Johnson and Thyne 2016). What is more, the effects of urban rebellion 
can often be directly observed by civilian elites – e.g. if certain quarters or roads 
become inaccessible – conveying battlefield information directly to politicians.7 Better 
information on urban armed conflict also stems from the nature of urban counter-
insurgency which typically involves civilian policing, surveillance, and social welfare 
measures (Ron 2003). This means civilian elites can rely on numerous civilian and 
military sources to form their beliefs about the threat environment. 
By contrast, regional rebellions typically occur on the fringes of national 
territory, far away from the inner perimeter of civilian elites’ threat perception.8 
Fighting is delegated to military elites who are expected to sacrifice themselves and 
 
6 Information asymmetry has long been identified as a key variable in violent conflict (e.g. Fearon 
1995).   
7 On the importance of battlefield information in civil wars, see Cunningham (2006).  
8 On average, regional rebellions occur 413 kilometers away from the capital, while center-seeking 
rebellions occur at an average distance of 69 kilometers from the capital (data from Allansson, 
Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).  
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their soldiers to hold the country together. In addition, crushing regional rebellions 
typically involves the use of crude military force while the involvement of civilian 
actors is much reduced (Schutte 2017). As a result of its specialization in dealing with 
such threats, coupled with the conflict’s geographical remoteness, the military has a 
significant informational advantage over its civilian principals (Brooks 2008; Egorov 
and Sonin 2011; McMahon and Slantchev 2015).9  
This information asymmetry can disalign civilian and military in two distinct 
ways: a “hawkish” scenario in which military leaders decide that civilian leaders 
provide insufficient support for fighting regional rebels, and a “dovish” scenario in 
which military elites want to settle for peace while civilian leaders prefer to continue 
fighting. In both scenarios, the key factor is disagreement over the conduct of the 
conflict, and the outcome as regards regime type – increased motivation of military 
elites to take over – is the same. The outcome as regards the approach to regional 
rebellion is different, depending on the type of scenario (hawkish or dovish). This, 
however, is not the main dependent variable of this paper. Both the hawkish and 
dovish scenarios entail a civil-military disalignment in which the regional rebellion 
creates extremely high stakes for the military – literally a matter of life and death – 
making them resent civilian leadership for conducting the war too carelessly and 
cluelessly.  
 
HAWKISH SCENARIO 
In the hawkish scenario, the military signals that threat levels are high and requests 
more resources to crush the regional rebellion. Civilian elites receive this as a noisy 
 
9 Information asymmetries also exist between senior officers, junior officers, and rank and file, but it 
can reasonably be assumed that higher-ranking officers can overcome these, albeit at a cost.  
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signal. At this point the “civil-military problematique” (Feaver 1996) kicks in: as 
civilian elites know that military elites have an incentive to exaggerate the threat to 
amplify their resources and, ultimately, political power, they will qualify or, worse, 
disregard the signal. In Feaver’s (1996, 154) words, “the military can describe in some 
detail the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy, but only the civilian can 
decide whether to feel threatened.” The military, as a result, will feel increasingly 
reluctant to engage in and share information with joint civil-military assessment 
institutions, further exacerbating information asymmetries in a vicious circle (Brooks 
2008, 45).  
To the extent that civilian and military elites disalign over both how and how 
committedly to combat the regional rebellion, we can expect the military’s frustration 
to rise and tolerance for civilian oversight to decay. Diverging threat perceptions can 
also lead to disagreements over strategy, doubts over civilian competence, and 
concerns over the military’s status, which have all been shown to trigger military 
intervention (Desch 2001, 11–12; Finer 1962, 27; Brooks 2008). Failing a move by 
the rebels closer to urban centers, military elites cannot make their assessment of rebel 
strength more credible.10 
The observable implications of this “hawkish” variant of disalignment are that 
civilian rulers have limited access to independent information about the regional 
conflict; they discount the military’s threat description, motivated by suspicions that 
 
10 Conversely, this would explain why some regional rebellions, such as the Tamil Tiger insurrection 
in Sri Lanka, did not lead to militarization as the rebels carried the war to the capital, directly threatening 
civilian elites. Similarly, inter-state war should be indicative of a fairly serious threat that is common 
knowledge between military and civilian elites. This is particularly true as civilian elites face high 
political costs if they endure military defeat at the hands of other states (Chiozza and Goemans 2004).  
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the military exaggerates the threat strategically (which can indeed be the case), in turn 
frustrating military leaders and motivating political intervention. All this should be 
reflected in military and civilian strategic discussions. In practice these can be difficult 
to observe, though we descriptively illustrate much of the process in the Burmese case 
below. 
 
DOVISH SCENARIO 
In the alternative dovish scenario, the military concludes that the losses from fighting 
the regional rebellion are too high and an honorable negotiated settlement is needed to 
avoid pointless bloodshed. Meanwhile civilian elites, with no personal skin in the 
game, believe a decisive military victory is attainable. Military elites could in principle 
simply tell their civilian principals that the rebels cannot be beaten. Yet, in practice 
military elites will have incentives not to do so. As Goemans (2008, 777) points out, 
acceptance of defeat by the military frequently entails a reorganization of the military, 
“with significant implications for the careers and prospects of the officer corps.” What 
is more, military elites themselves compete with other officers and thus know that the 
risk of rival brass coming forward and declaring that s/he will be capable of defeating 
the rebels is real (Brooks 2008, 50). Save for putting their career and position in the 
regime coalition at stake, military elites may therefore decide that the only way of 
ending the conflict is to take over control themselves.11 Even in cases where military 
elites initially share their concerns with civilian rulers, extant research on strategic 
assessment suggests that, fearing that continued dissent will entail professional 
suicide, they will begin to withhold information, grow wary of participating in joint 
 
11 This is in line with Thyne’s (2017) finding that coups carried out during civil wars actually decrease 
the duration of the conflict. 
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forums, and act more independently in the face of continuing disagreement with 
civilians (Brooks 2008, 5; 250). Ultimately, they may conclude that a fundamental 
change of strategy can only be achieved by forcefully sidelining civilian rulers.  
The observable implications of this “dovish” variant of disalignment are that 
military leaders become convinced that a military solution is impossible; cease 
communicating this to civilian elites (or never communicate it in the first place) out 
of fears of punishment and demotion, and eventually take this as a reason to intervene. 
This process is illustrated in the Thai example below. 
 
EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
Burma’s 1962 coup is a useful example of the hawkish scenario unfolding under 
conditions of information asymmetry. In April 1960, Prime Minister U Nu was 
reelected after handing over power to a military caretaker government under General 
Ne Win in 1958. While rebel activity throughout Burma had markedly declined 
between 1958-1960, Nu’s return to office in 1960 coincided with a rapid resurgence 
of rebel militancy in Shan state. Simultaneously, the Karen National Defence 
Organization (KNDO) intensified their military campaign in apparent coordination 
with Shan rebels. Additionally, with alleged weapons supply from the US, remnants 
of the Chinese Kuomintang fighters present on Burmese territory joined forces with 
Karen and Shan rebels in early 1961 (Trager 1963, 316–317). The resurgence of rebel 
activity was viewed extremely anxiously by the army (Smith 1991, 185). In 
declassified CIA reports from January 1961, chief of staff Ne Win is quoted saying 
that the situation has reached “serious proportions” (CIA 1961a).  
In stark contrast, Nu seemed to be in denial, rejecting the risk assessment put 
forward by the army. The split of the AFPFL ruling party in April 1958 decimated 
local party infrastructure and left Nu with very limited sources of independent civilian 
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information on developments in the countryside (Butwell and von der Mehden 1960). 
In August 1960, he stated that “there’s calm, peace, and lack of tension in the country, 
no one can deny it” (New York Times 1960). In fact, he blamed rebel “luck” and, 
paradoxically, the army’s success in forcing rebels out of hideouts for the worsening 
security situation and denied that the situation was “as bad as 1949-50” – the worst 
year of the insurrection (Smith 1991, 189–190; Trager 1963, 317–318). This caused 
an outcry in the Burmese press, which demanded a vigorous increase in the size of the 
armed forces and more military spending (Trager 1963, 317–318).  
Yet, this would have gone against Nu’s goal of pushing back the influence of 
the army (CIA 1960b, 1960a). Nu had previously accused the army of favoring the 
rival Stable AFPFL party before the election (Bigelow 1960, 71). Accepting the 
military’s risk assessment and boosting the army’s resources and standing was thus 
not an option. Holding out vigorously against army budget requests (Callahan 2005, 
6, fn. 42), Nu diverted troops to the Chinese border for survey and demarcation 
missions, reorganized the army and gave the civilian Ministry of Defense tighter 
control over all military activities (Callahan 2005, 202; Chang 1969, 826). The CIA 
noted in May 1961 that the war effort against ethnic insurgencies had visibly declined 
(CIA 1961c). With Nu’s refusal to acknowledge the heightened security threat, 
patience within the military evaporated (CIA 1961b), culminating in a military coup 
led by Ne Win in March 1962. In one of their first post-coup statements, the army 
promised “to stamp out” the resurgent insurgencies (cited in Trager 1963, 322).  
Such hawkish scenarios differ meaningfully from the dovish scenario. The 
latter is well illustrated by the coup against Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
in September 2006. Here, the military’s frustration with Thaksin’s heavy-handed 
handling of the insurgency in the country’s South was a key driver (Funston 2009; 
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McCargo 2007; Pongsudhirak 2006; Sheridan 2006). Thaksin responded to early 
incidents of violence in 2001 by berating the army in the South, threatening that 
“transfers will be ordered for those who are inefficient […] They won’t be around 
here” (McCargo 2006, 47). At the same time, and despite a worsening security 
situation from mid-2001, Thaksin disbanded the military-led Southern Border 
Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) and the joint civilian-police-military task 
force, CPM 43, and diverted control from the military to the police, with which he 
enjoyed closer political ties (Croissant 2007, 11; International Crisis Group 2005a, 33; 
McCargo 2006, 48).  
As the conflict worsened from 2002 onwards, Thaksin ordered the police and 
army to respond with full force (Pathmanand 2006). Martial law was introduced to 
three Southern provinces in January 2004 and troop size increased radically, reaching 
20,000 by October 2005 (ICG 2005a, 19). This repressive strategy resulted in a rapidly 
rising death toll – over 1,000 between 2004 and 2006 (Pathmanand 2006, 74) – and 
increasing government abuses, such as the suffocation of 85 Muslim men in detention 
in Bak Tai (ICG 2005a, ii). High-ranking military officers were deeply unhappy about 
this incident, which they saw as tarnishing their reputation (Pathmanand 2006, 82). 
The killing and public display of mutilated Thai marines in September 2005 left a 
profound psychological impact on troops in the South (ICG 2005b, 19). While military 
casualties were as high as police casualties (Chalk 2008, 10), decision-making had 
been placed in the hands of the police, with profound repercussions for strategic 
assessment and information sharing with civilian authorities.  
While the police kept feeding Thaksin intelligence blaming organized 
criminals for the resurgent violence and engaged in extra-judicial killings of former 
army informants (ICG 2005a, 34), the military command in the South gradually 
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stopped sharing information with civilian leaders in Bangkok. According to General 
Vinai Pattiyakul, secretary-general of the National Security Council, “[military] 
intelligence agencies had discovered the establishment of separatist insurgency 
networks since 2002 but no one dared tell the prime minister” (cited in Pathmanand 
2006, 79). Thaksin’s actions gradually established a belief among the army high 
command that, as a former police lieutenant colonel, Thaksin would rather listen to 
the police than the military and that speaking out would only add one’s name to the 
list of inefficient officers to be rotated out (McCargo 2006, 49). Even Thaksin’s 
cousin, General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, who briefly assumed the role as commander-
in-chief between 2003 and 2004, quickly came to believe that Thaksin favored the 
police (McCargo 2006, 54) – he was only one of five commanders-in-chief in an 
increasingly arbitrary pattern of punishment transfers (ICG 2007, 1; McCargo 2006, 
53–54). 
The impact of this breakdown of information sharing on the government’s 
ability to manage the rebellion was devastating. “A source familiar with Thaksin’s 
intelligence-gathering capabilities argued that the prime minister lacked accurate 
information and analysis of developments in the South. By early 2004, the government 
had virtually no reliable human intelligence from the ground” and “[i]t seemed 
abundantly clear that no one in power really understood what was happening around 
the southern border” (McCargo 2006, 51;54). US embassy cables repeatedly mention 
a phenomenon of stove-piping (often erroneous) information from local agencies to 
Bangkok (Wikileaks 2005, 2006a). At the same time, the army began to increasingly 
act independently of Thaksin, with soldiers sharing information only with senior army 
officials (ICG 2007, 1;16; Wikileaks 2006b, 3). Reestablished joint command 
structures in 2004 were in effect boycotted by the police and did not repair the 
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informational breakdown (Pathmanand 2006, 82). Additionally, the Southern army 
command and indeed officers in central command increasingly turned to the Privy 
Council and the King to voice their concerns. Harsh criticism of Thaksin’s strategy by 
the Council’s president and vice-president in 2004 can thus be seen as expression of 
military frustration (ICG 2005b, 2; McCargo 2006, 62–63). Following a meeting 
between Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir and Thai King Bhumibol, the army 
displayed their keenness to end the conflict by engaging in secret negotiations with 
the rebels under Mahathir’s auspices, an approach rejected by Thaksin (Harish and 
Liow 2007, 172; ICG 2007, 2). 
Emboldened by his election landslide in 2005, Thaksin “supplemented martial 
law in the South with an emergency decree in July 2005[, which] transferred the 
responsibility for dealing with the insurgency […] to the prime minister’s office” 
(Storey 2008, 42). Meanwhile, Thaksin paid lip service to a more conciliatory 
approach by establishing a national reconciliation committee, while ignoring the 
dovish request of his commander-in-chief Sonthi for a negotiated solution (Harish and 
Liow 2007, 170). Instead, he publicly chided Sonthi in June 2006 for failing to prevent 
a wave of bombings (ICG 2007, 1). Thus, prior to the coup in September 2006, it was 
clear that “[t]he Army were deeply unhappy that they were being blamed for a problem 
they believed Thaksin and the police […] had largely created” (McCargo 2007, 14). 
Days before the coup, General Sonthi declared: “Soldiers all of us, privates and 
generals, are risking our lives every day. I don't want to see […] politicians putting all 
the blame on field officers” (Human Rights Watch 2007).  
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Operations 
The second mechanism linking regional rebellions to militarization relies on the 
particular operational experiences that militaries acquire in fighting regional 
rebellions. They tend to lead to 1) a stronger esprit de corps and social cohesion of the 
military; 2) improved coordination capacity across military branches; and 3) increases 
in the military’s non-coercive organizational and bureaucratic capacity. We derive 
these effects from existing civil-military literature and illustrate them briefly with the 
cases of the Mauritanian and Indonesian military takeovers. 
As we mention above, militaries are not the only organizations that regimes 
have at their disposal to battle rebels. Institutions for civilian policing and bureaucratic 
governance can also be enlisted “to win hearts and minds.” Yet the remoteness and 
specificities of the terrain rebels hide in can greatly complicate the involvement of 
civilian actors. This means that militaries are often given a free hand, as much by 
default as by design, to suppress regional rebellions. Such campaigns tend to rely on 
military force alone, in contrast to joint civilian-military interventions prevalent in 
urban counterinsurgency (Ron 2003). This is evidenced by Schutte’s (2017) finding 
that the use of crude military force without civilian involvement increases with 
distance from the capital city. This shared operational experience devoid of civilian 
support can significantly enhance the military’s esprit de corps and increase its 
cohesion as a status group. Both esprit de corps and symbolic status of militaries have 
been associated with a higher inclination to engage in politics (Finer 1962, xv;10; 
Nordlinger 1977, 65). Note that this process operates, in principle, independent of 
disalignment: Higher cohesion and social status resulting from the fighting of regional 
wars do not automatically lead to disagreement over the conduct of operations and 
vice-versa – regional wars just tend to trigger both in parallel. 
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The observable implications of this process are straightforward: Separate, 
autonomous operations during regional rebellions boost the military’s social cohesion 
and elevate its social status over time. This, in turn, can facilitate political involvement. 
This is what we observe in the example of Mauritania where the military’s social status 
and collective identity as a leading national institution strengthened considerably 
throughout the conflict with Western Saharan rebels from 1975. While the military 
was embryonic when President Ould Daddah started the conflict, it gained significant 
combat experience and esprit de corps over the coming years, preparing the top brass 
for the 1978 takeover of power from a civilian leader perceived as detached and 
strategically inept (Pazzanita 1996, 47).12 
The coup literature further points to the importance of coordination capacity 
in making military takeovers possible (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Singh 2014). The 
conduct of regional military operations typically leads to the improvement of exactly 
such capacity between different military units as it often relies on different branches 
of the military working closely together. This is, again, a process that in principle is 
clearly observable in terms of increased cooperation of military branches over time, 
the more frequent interaction of senior officers it brings about, and the military elite’s 
subsequent use of such capacity to coordinate collective political action. For example, 
while Indonesia’s army had been rife with competition between the army, navy, and 
 
12 Although less well documented, the Mauritanian case also illustrates the information asymmetry 
aspect of the disalignment mechanism. President Ould Daddah drastically underestimated the resistance 
from Sahrawi independence fighters (Clausen 1982, 40). The eventual military takeover was led by 
army chief of staff Mustafa Ould Salek, whose position “put him in a unique position to assess the 
increasingly unwinnable Western Saharan war” (Pazzanita 1996, 202) – information that he did not 
manage to credibly convey to the president, who insisted on continuing the high-cost conflict. 
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air force (Kingsbury 2003, 141), fighting rebels in Indonesia (1957-61) involved close 
cooperation of the country’s air force, a sea blockade carried out by Indonesia’s navy, 
and the deployment of infantry units, especially paratroopers (Doeppers 1972; Feith 
and Lev 1963). Institutionally this led to the establishment of the Central War 
Administration, which coordinated military efforts during the state of emergency. 
Such cooperation leads to a better exchange on preferences within the military and 
better information on the likely support for military involvement in politics. While we 
would expect junior officers and rank and file to be busy fighting the rebellion, elite 
officers, having improved their coordination capacity, can potentially rely on troops 
not deployed in the restive region to overthrow the civilian government. This is 
supported in our data as all military takeovers following regional rebellions but one 
(the Comoros in 1998) were carried out by the military leadership, often led by chiefs 
of staff.  
Finally, waging war against regional rebels heightens the organizational and 
bureaucratic capacity of the army. The war effort is typically accompanied by 
processes of professionalization and expansion of the military organization. 
Importantly, this expansion often means that the army branches out into civilian realms 
of government and production. This is directly observable in the widening of non-core 
operations and attendant organizational changes of the military, which in turn motivate 
and facilitate political involvement and takeover by the military.  As Eck (2015, 232) 
remarks on the case of Burma, “[i]n 1952, Ne Win reorganized and expanded the 
resources dedicated to officer training [and] the armed forces ventured into business 
by setting up the Defense Services Institute (DSI) which, by 1960, was running banks, 
shipping lines, and the largest import–export operation in the country […] this 
organization was established to ensure that armed units were supplied.” Similarly, Lev 
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(1964, 351) shows that martial law declared on the Indonesian islands of Sulawesi and 
Sumatra made the military the de facto rulers of the islands, subordinating the civilian 
administration to military orders. These processes of organizational and bureaucratic 
upgrading bestow precious managerial capacities upon military elites, putting them on 
par with civilian elites. As the Indonesian chief of staff, Nasution, declared in front of 
military cadets in 1958, the army “must be given an opportunity to make use of their 
skills in the Cabinet, the National Council, the National Planning Board, diplomatic 
posts, and elsewhere in government” (Lev 1964, 359). As a result of their 
“unconventional” activities the army would “feel they have as much to contribute as 
civilian leaders to the nation's development, perhaps more” (Lev 1964, 364). 
In sum, fighting regional rebels tends to augment the military’s esprit de corps, 
coordination, and organizational capacity, giving military brass more confidence in 
their abilities, including in the civilian realm. All three factors are progressively 
strengthened as fighting becomes more intense and protracted. As Maung (1969, 231) 
points out in the case of Burma, with the civilian government confined to major towns, 
the long duration of the rebellion forced officers to acquire leadership skills of civilian 
administrators. Ultimately, their improved skills in governance can lead the military 
to believe that they are not only better placed to decide how to fight the war, but also 
– when disagreeing with civilian leaders  – better able to run the country, either directly 
or indirectly.  
The disalignment and operations mechanisms provide conceptually separate 
pathways to militarization, although they may influence each other. Heightened self-
esteem and capacity can lead to more coherent interests that are more clearly 
disaligned with civilian leadership. Disalignment itself might also trigger greater 
efforts to operate autonomously. While such mutual causation is conceivable, the 
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mechanisms can operate in parallel (as in our illustrative case material). They can also 
operate without each other: For example, operational capacities might remain low due 
to political or social reasons (such as the class or communal cleavages of many 
militaries), yet military brass can disagree with civilian leaders about strategy in a 
regional conflict.13  
 
Testing external validity: Quantitative analysis 
We now subject our theory to quantitative tests to establish whether the association 
between regional rebellion and militarization holds in a global context. Our theoretical 
discussion thus far implies the following hypotheses:  
H1: Countries that experience regional rebellions are more likely to become 
militarized authoritarian regimes. 
H2: More intense regional conflicts should lead to greater militarization of the 
regime.  
We test these predictions by fitting two separate sets of regressions for the 
emergence of military regimes (H1) and for their extent of militarization (H2). In the 
Online Appendix, we also test a third hypothesis, namely that military rulers emerging 
from regional rebellions cling to power longer as their motivation and capacity to do 
so are stronger due to preceding preference disalignment and operational experience, 
resulting in a strong preference against the return to civilian rule. Our findings are 
supportive of this claim, albeit less unequivocally than for H1 and H2.  
 
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to spell this potential interaction out more 
clearly.  
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Data  
We use Svolik’s (2012) dataset on authoritarian regimes to measure the variable of 
primary interest – regime militarization. We prefer Svolik’s data over alternative 
datasets for three reasons: First, tit has the widest coverage in terms of countries, 
yielding over 8,500 observations compared to 7,700 for the alternative Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz (2014) data. Second, the dataset allows for an unambiguous coding 
of military regimes which avoids the problem of manifold hybrids as in the Geddes et 
al. data. Third, and critically, the data distinguishes different degrees of military 
involvement in politics, enabling us to capture militarization below the level of a full-
fledged military takeover.  
We code the variable Military regime for all autocracies as 1 if military 
involvement in politics is either indirect, i.e., “the head of the executive is a civilian 
executive but the military intervenes in government policies unrelated to national 
security” (Svolik 2012, codebook), or military involvement is direct. In the latter case, 
military rule can be institutionalized in a corporate fashion (e.g. the classical junta) or 
be personal with the military ruling through a personal leader without 
institutionalization (Slater 2003). Non-military regimes are coded 0 and comprise both 
civilian autocracies and democracies. We also construct a categorical measure of 
military regimes (Military regime categorical) to test our militarization hypothesis 
(H2). The variable takes the value of 0 for non-military regimes, 1 for indirect military 
rule, and 2 for direct military rule.14 
Data for our main independent variables – regional rebellions and, as contrast 
cases, center-seeking rebellions – are taken from the UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed 
 
14 Ideally, we would measure militarization on a continuum, but we are limited by lack of available 
data. 
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conflicts (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002). We define 
a rebellion as regional if the incompatibility underlying the conflict is over a territory. 
Center-seeking rebellions are characterized by incompatibility over government. As 
the total effect of rebellion is unlikely to unfold in one year only, we model the effect 
of rebellion with an exponential decay function. Specifically, the variable Regional 
rebellion (decay) takes the value of 1 whenever a regional rebellion is ongoing after 
which it decays exponentially with a half-life of one year. Center-seeking rebellion 
(decay) is defined equivalently for rebellions with incompatibility over government.15 
To measure the intensity of rebellions, we also create an additional count variable 
Duration of regional/center-seeking rebellion measuring the duration of an ongoing 
rebellion in years. We prefer this measure over alternative indicators, such as casualty 
numbers or the economic cost of destruction, which are frequently unreliable.16  
Although Piplani and Talmadge (2015) have argued that inter-state conflict 
makes regime military overthrows less likely, we err on the side of caution by 
including a control variable for the incidence of inter-state wars in a given year 
(Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).17 In addition, we 
 
15 Our results are robust when using alternative half-lives (2, 3, and 5 years). We also obtain very 
similar, albeit slightly weaker, results when using a dummy version of regional and center-seeking 
rebellion which constrains the total effect of rebellion to unfold in one year (see Online Appendix, 
Tables A7-A8). 
16 Five percent of center-seeking and three percent of regional rebellions in our dataset received support 
from external actors (data from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). Unsurprisingly, tests 
show that it is the unsupported regional rebellions which drive our finding. External support as a control 
variable is insignificant and leaves our findings unchanged. Results available upon request.  
17 We also experimented with a decaying and duration version of War. There was no improvement in 
model fit and substantive findings are identical. Results available upon request. 
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include a battery of socioeconomic and political controls in our baseline models. As 
the democratization literature suggests a strong link between a country’s wealth and 
regime type (Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), GDP p.c. (log) 
measures the logged per capita GDP in constant 2005 USD (taken from Bolt and van 
Zanden 2014).18 We also include Population size (log) using data from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). 
Establishing military rule in politically open systems might be harder; 
conversely, transition to democracy might be easier. We therefore include the variable 
Polity to approximate a country’s degree of political openness using the standard 
Polity 2 indicator (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010). The variable Military 
capabilities (cube root) is based on the widely-used composite index of national 
capability and captures, amongst others, material benefits directed towards the military 
(Singer et al. 1972, v5.0). Transformation using a cube root function yields the closest 
approximation to a normal distribution.  
The coup literature highlights that civil unrest increases the risk of a military 
takeover (e.g. Johnson and Thyne 2016). Based on the Banks (2011) dataset, we 
therefore include the variable Unrest (log) in the regressions, which sums up and log-
transforms the number of riots, demonstrations, and general strikes occurring in each 
country-year. Conflicts leading to military rule might also be more likely in religiously 
fractionalized societies. We therefore include a measure of Religious fractionalization 
(Alesina et al. 2003). Finally, we control for regional fixed effects by including region 
 
18 GDP data on missing countries are taken from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 
2012). We only use one data source per country. Our findings are nearly identical when using Bolt and 
van Zanden data only. 
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dummies.19 Taking into account the effects of listwise deletion, our main models 
generally comprise the time period from 1961 until 2008.20   
 
Modelling military regime emergence 
Our first hypothesis posits that regional rebellions make the subsequent emergence of 
a military regime more likely. This calls for a model of military regime onset, which 
we model as a Markov transition model. The model allows us to separate the effect of 
rebellions on regime onset from the effect on regime durability by conditioning the 
model on whether or not an event occurred in the previous year (Beck 2008, 490). In 
our case, this means that we condition the model on the absence of a military regime 
in the previous period. Modelling event onset this way has been shown to be superior 
to alternative strategies, such as setting ongoing years to zero or missing (McGrath 
2015). We opt for the widely-used binary time-series cross-sectional (BTSCS) 
regression model as our statistical workhorse. The model takes the following 
specification: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3 + 𝛽4𝜗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡), (1) 
where 𝛼 designates the constant, R our measure of regional rebellions, X a 
vector of covariates, and 𝛿 regional fixed effects. To deal with the issue of repeated 
events, we add the event counter 𝜗 measuring the number of previous transitions to a 
military regime (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). We add 𝜇, a vector of cubic time 
polynomials to account for duration dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).21 All 
 
19 Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in the Online Appendix, Table A1.  
20 Descriptive patterns for H1 and H2 are shown in the Online Appendix, Figure A1 and A2.  
21 The measure of duration time captures the time spent until the emergence of a military regime. 
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variables except for regional fixed effects and the event counter are lagged by one year 
to ensure the correct order of temporal dependence. 
One characteristic of the above model is that, by pooling the data, it does not 
clearly separate between-country and within-country effects. This is potentially 
problematic as our findings could be driven by unit-level (country) effects which the 
proposed specification fails to account for. We therefore also estimate a more 
conservative conditional logit model which controls for country-specific effects by 
conditioning on the number of successes in a group (Chamberlain 1980).22 
Conditioning on successes, in turn, means that all countries that did not experience a 
military regime are dropped from the analysis, and time-invariant variables cannot be 
estimated.23  
The results of our pooled and fixed effects transition models are summarized 
in Table 1. Columns 1-4 report the pooled logit model while successively adding 
control variables; column 5 reports the results of the conditional logit model. Taken 
together, the results provide strong support for our claim (H1) that regional rebellions 
are associated with an increased likelihood of military regime emergence. Looking at 
the pooled logit model (columns 1-4), the coefficients of Regional rebellion are 
positive and highly statistically significant throughout. This contrasts with Center-
seeking rebellion for which the model does not find a statistically significant effect. 
War, another potential confounder of the effect of regional rebellion, is also 
 
22 Simply adding country dummies into the logit regression would be problematic due to the incidental 
parameters problem (Beck 2015).  
23 To ensure that dropping countries does not bias our results, we test an alternative fixed effects 
specification using the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach (Chamberlain 1982; Mundlak 1978) in the 
Online Appendix (Tables A5-A6).  
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insignificant, suggesting that the cohesion or political ambition of military elites 
primarily, if not exclusively, stems from regional rebellions. Adding further controls 
diminishes the effect of regional rebellion only slightly. Our findings on control 
variables are mostly in line with theoretical expectations: Military takeovers are less 
likely in politically more open countries (Polity) and whenever greater resources are 
directed toward the military (Mil. Capabilities), while Unrest facilitates military 
power grabs. Reassuringly, Regional rebellion retains its strong positive effect in the 
conditional logit model.24  
To illustrate the substantive effect of regional rebellions we look at the 
percentage increase in the likelihood of a military regime emergence relative to the 
average baseline probability. In the pooled model (column 1), the average annual 
probability of a transition to a military regime is 1.78 percent. A regional rebellion 
increases the likelihood on average by 1.66 percentage points, representing a 
remarkable 93 percent increase. In the case of the conditional logit model, the average 
increase is even bigger. Expressed in terms of odds ratios, the coefficient of Regional 
rebellion in the conditional logit is 7.8, meaning the odds of military regime 
emergence are nearly 8 times higher when there is preceding regional conflict. 25 Given 
our measurement of Regional rebellion as decaying over time, we also illustrate the 
temporal decline in the probability of military regime emergence following a regional 
rebellion. This is done in Figure 1. Following a significant increase in the probability 
of a transition toward military rule in period t, the probability gradually declines in 
 
24 Separation plots (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011) shown in the Online Appendix attest a reasonably 
good model fit. 
25 Unfortunately, it is not possibility to derive predicted probabilities from conditional logic models. 
31 
 
periods t1 to t4 until returning to levels around the baseline probability of about 1.8 
percent in t5. 
As emphasized in the theory section, the information asymmetries between 
military and civilian political elites result from the remoteness of regional rebellions 
from urban centers. An observable implication of this is that regional rebellions should 
make military regime emergence more likely the farther they are away from the 
capital. This prediction receives strong support in data, as shown in the Online 
Appendix (Table A10 and Figure A6). This finding contrasts with Bell and Sudduth’s 
(2017) finding that coups during civil wars become increasingly likely the closer the 
war moves to the capital. While some differences in the models might be expected due 
to the different dependent variables (coups vs. militarized regimes), we suspect that 
their sample restriction to only cases with ongoing civil wars (1441) accounts for most 
of the difference.  
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Figure 1: Effect of regional rebellion on military regime emergence 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table 1, column 1. Regional rebellion set at 1, 
0.5, 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625 according to decay function. All other covariates set at 
their observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). All figure layouts are based 
on Bischof (2017).  
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Table 1: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.998 1.010 0.892 0.858 2.057 
 (0.444)** (0.440)** (0.434)** (0.417)** (0.982)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.386 0.388 0.295 0.261 1.143 
 (0.363) (0.364) (0.346) (0.351) (0.734) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.159 -0.160 -0.172 0.009 -0.850 
 (0.238) (0.238) (0.234) (0.265) (0.856) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.042 0.044 -0.007 0.368 2.672 
 (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) (0.215)* (2.087) 
Polity t-1 -0.127 -0.127 -0.142 -0.153 -0.408 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.196 0.198 0.167 0.127 -1.055 
 (0.213) (0.214) (0.237) (0.250) (0.978) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.143 0.041 0.373 0.400 
  (0.774) (0.751) (0.741) (1.050) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.480 0.515 -0.097 
   (0.151)*** (0.154)*** (0.304) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.574 -1.687  
   (0.693)** (0.746)**  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.101 -18.464 
    (5.002)** (32.296) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Modelling regime militarization 
We use multinomial logistic regression to test our second hypothesis on regime militarization.26 
The dependent variable in this model is Military regime categorical which comprises three 
different categories: 0 for non-military regimes, 1 for indirect, and 2 for direct military rule. 
The intensity of regional rebellions is captured by our duration indicator Duration of regional 
rebellion. The multinomial logit takes the following functional form:  
Pr(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑙. 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡), (2) 
where 𝛼 designates the constant, D our measure of rebellion duration, X a vector of 
covariates, the event counter 𝜗,27 and 𝜇, a vector of cubic time polynomials.28 As before, all 
variables save for the event counter are lagged by one year. Note that we do not condition the 
model on the absence of a military regime in the previous year as we did in the case of the 
Markov transition model. This choice reflects the fact that further militarization can occur even 
after the regime has transitioned to a military regime. That said, we also run the model on the 
subset of military regimes only to test if the intensity of rebellion leads to further militarization 
after the transition to military rule has occurred, effectively making the multinomial logit a 
choice model between indirect and direct military rule.  
Table 2 displays the results predicting Military regime categorical. Columns 1-4 report 
the regression coefficients for the unrestricted sample of military and non-military regimes 
combined. Column 5 presents the results for military regimes only. The base category in the 
first four models is non-military regimes. In model 5, the base category is indirect military rule. 
 
26 We give preference to multinomial over ordinal regression as the assumption of proportional odds in the ordinal 
regression model are not met. That said, results using ordinal logit are nearly identical.  
27 An event is defined as any change in the dependent variable. Duration time thus means the time elapsed until 
such a change occurs. 
28 For the model to converge we had to refrain from using regional fixed effects.  
35 
 
As before, we add controls successively in columns 1-4. The findings provide substantive 
evidence for our claim that regional rebellions militarize regimes by pushing regimes more 
towards direct military rule.  
We illustrate the size of the effect for all regimes combined in Figure 2 and for the 
subset of military regimes only in Figure 3. Both figures plot the effect of our categorical 
variable for different durations of regional conflict and illustrate the increasing probability of 
direct military rule at the expense of both indirect and no military rule. 29 In the two cases, 
direct military rule becomes significantly more likely than indirect rule the longer regional 
conflicts endure.  
 
Figure 2: Effect of regional rebellion duration on militarization (all regimes)  
 
 
29 0 to 25 years of conflict correspond to the 1st and 99th percentile in our regression sample.  
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Note: Marginal effects derived from Table 2, column 4. All other covariates set at their 
observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
 
Figure 3: Effect of regional rebellion duration on militarization (military regimes only) 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table 2, column 5. All other covariates set at their 
observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
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Table 2: Regional rebellions and regime militarization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.015  
Military  (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)  
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018  
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)  
 GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.214 -0.213 -0.132 -0.068  
  (0.157) (0.157) (0.153) (0.175)  
 Population size (log) t-1 -0.057 -0.055 -0.110 -0.012  
  (0.128) (0.128) (0.125) (0.279)  
 Polity t-1 -0.182 -0.183 -0.189 -0.189  
  (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)***  
 Previous failures 0.023 0.024 0.020 0.019  
  (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.010)*  
 War (dummy) t-1  -0.125 -0.535 0.019  
   (0.652) (0.532) (0.684)  
 Unrest (log) t-1   0.036 0.051  
    (0.166) (0.166)  
 Rel. fractionalization t-1   0.480 0.500  
    (0.588) (0.588)  
 Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -2.790  
     (6.399)  
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.110 0.114 0.118 0.120 0.116 
Military  (0.030)*** (0.028)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.050)** 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.131 -0.134 -0.146 -0.150 -0.144 
  (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.051)*** 
 GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.198 -0.198 -0.318 -0.150 -0.044 
  (0.176) (0.176) (0.175)* (0.251) (0.394) 
 Population size (log) t-1 0.263 0.273 0.227 0.500 0.553 
  (0.103)** (0.104)*** (0.098)** (0.289)* (0.542) 
 Polity t-1 -0.180 -0.182 -0.189 -0.191 0.002 
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  (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.043) 
 Previous failures 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.011 -0.339 
  (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)* (0.008) (0.593) 
 War (dummy) t-1  -0.506 -0.059 -0.413 0.202 
   (0.520) (0.677) (0.560) (0.196) 
 Unrest (log) t-1   0.232 0.264 -1.964 
    (0.169) (0.169) (1.125)* 
 Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.331 -1.334 -5.399 
    (0.665)** (0.698)* (13.638) 
 Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -7.205 -0.008 
     (7.759) (0.014) 
NxT 6,164 6,164 6,053 6,052 1,200 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No No No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No No No No Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Columns 1-4 unrestricted sample, base category: non-military regimes. Column 
5 restricted sample on military regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Robustness tests  
We subject our results to a panoply of robustness tests which are all detailed in the Online 
Appendix. Specifically, we  
(i) use the alternative Mundlak-Chamberlain approach to run our fixed effects logit 
regression (Tables A5-6);  
(ii) use a dummy version of regional and center-seeking rebellions instead of the 
decaying variable (Tables A7-8);  
(iii) test a binary indicator of military coups instead of military regimes, receiving very 
similar findings (Table A9) 
(iv) test whether the distance of a regional rebellion to the capital increases the 
likelihood of military regime emergence, which is an observable implication of our 
theory (Table A10);  
(v) use instrumental variables to take into account the potential endogeneity between 
military regime and rebellions (Table A11);  
(vi) add further or alternative controls, such as ethnic fractionalization, resource rents, 
population density, trade, a binary control for the post-Cold War period (which by 
and large has no substantive effect) and a dummy for prior regime type (Tables 
A12-14);  
(vii) control for potential diffusion effects of military regimes and democratization by 
controlling for the share of military regimes and democracies in the neighborhood, 
variously defined (Tables A15-17);  
(viii) test alternative time specification such as temporal splines (Tables A18-20); 
(ix) rerun all our models using a coding of military regimes based on the alternative 
Geddes et al. (2014) (Tables A21-22);  
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(x) test alternative half-lives for our decaying variables (2, 3, and 5 years) (Tables A23-
A28);  
(xi) exclude countries with the greatest leverage on our regression coefficient Regional 
rebellion (Tables A29-20).  
As expected, some of these tests render our findings weaker or less precise. That said, 
most of the robustness tests yield substantively identical or even stronger findings for military 
regime emergence and militarization. As for potential endogeneity concerns, strong findings 
from our instrumental variable regression strengthen our claim that it is regional rebellions that 
cause militarization, not the other way around. 
 
Conclusion 
If war makes states, and if states and regimes are empirically intertwined, it stands to reason 
that different types of wars make different types of regimes. We have found strong quantitative 
evidence in support of our claim that regional rebellions are systematically more likely than 
other types of wars to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. 
This calls new attention to war as a causal variable in the ever-expanding literature on 
authoritarianism. While the focus in this piece has been on the specific case of militarized 
authoritarian regimes, our findings contribute to the study of authoritarianism more broadly by 
systematically addressing the question of why different types of authoritarian regimes emerge 
and endure. In equal measure, our analysis advances the bellicist literature by pivoting the 
debate from war as an outcome to be explained towards war as a producer of politics. Finally, 
we refine the literature on civil-military relations and coups by arguing and demonstrating that 
only one type of armed conflict – regional rebellions – increases the likelihood of military take-
overs. We also reemphasize the critical point that “military rule” does not always originate 
from a coup. Military takeover of power can be gradually negotiated, such as in many Latin 
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American countries in the 1950s-1970s (e.g. Uruguay), or be relinquished to the military as 
occurred in the case of Burma in 1958 which is not coded as a coup by any of the prominent 
global coup datasets (Marshall and Marshall 2014; Powell and Thyne 2011). 
Much remains to be done to investigate the ways in which rebellions impact regimes. 
Although the correlation between regional rebellions and political militarization is robust and 
systematic, it is far more difficult to determine with confidence that the causal mechanisms we 
posit here are the most important ones driving this result. Future research should both collect 
further case study evidence and, as far as sources allow, standardized data on the causal 
mechanisms we have posited to assess their generalizability.  
It will also be important to assess why regional rebellions sometimes do not give rise 
to regime militarization. In some cases, fear of a coup might pre-emptively align civilian 
leaderships with military preferences. Conversely, some categories of cases might be outside 
of the scope conditions of our theory, as institutional traditions of militaries suppress any 
political ambitions (as in richer democracies, but probably also some poor democracies like 
India). Considering how little we know about the effects of different types of war on different 
types of political regimes, when compared to how much we know about how war makes states, 
our contribution here is but a modest start on what will hopefully become a much wider and 
sustained collective scholarly endeavor. 
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
 N Mean Sd Min Max 
Military regime 8569 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Military regime categorical 8569 0.241 0.560 0 2 
Regional rebellion (decay) 16204 0.0442 0.199 0 1 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) 16150 0.0674 0.238 0 1 
Previously experienced regional rebellion  16333 0.101 0.302 0 1 
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion 16333 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Directly following regional rebellion 3834 0.0764 0.266 0 1 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion 3834 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Duration of regional rebellion 9619 0.891 5.057 0 66 
Duration of ideological rebellion 9619 0.796 3.770 0 50 
Regional rebellion (dummy) 9620 0.0681 0.252 0 1 
Center-seeking rebellion (dummy) 9620 0.0984 0.298 0 1 
GDP p.c. (log) 10416 8.365 1.096 5.7 11.5 
Population size (log) 10119 15.22 2.070 9.2 21.0 
Polity 8937 0.625 7.488 -10 10 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) 8829 126.4 94.61 6.2 726.8 
Unrest (log) 9705 0.356 0.676 0 4.5 
War (dummy) 14600 0.0170 0.129 0 1 
Rel. fractionalization  13277 0.442 0.257 0 0.9 
Rents p.c. (log)  9335 2.815 3.013 0 11.4 
Population density  12936 226.2 1395.1 0.5 25322.8 
Trade  7556 76.46 48.32 0.3 531.7 
Post Cold War 9207 0.391 0.488 0 1 
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Table A2: Countries included in main model 
Country N Percent Country N Percent 
Afghanistan 25 0.53 Latvia 17 0.36 
Albania 48 1.02 Lebanon 17 0.36 
Algeria 9 0.19 Lesotho 34 0.72 
Angola 32 0.68 Liberia 33 0.7 
Argentina 33 0.7 Libya 9 0.19 
Australia 48 1.02 Lithuania 17 0.36 
Austria 48 1.02 Luxembourg 48 1.02 
Bahrain 37 0.78 Macedonia 16 0.34 
Bangladesh 35 0.74 Madagascar 45 0.95 
Belarus 17 0.36 Malawi 44 0.93 
Belgium 48 1.02 Malaysia 48 1.02 
Benin 23 0.49 Mali 25 0.53 
Bhutan 38 0.8 Mauritania 21 0.44 
Bolivia 31 0.66 Mauritius 40 0.85 
Botswana 42 0.89 Mexico 48 1.02 
Brazil 27 0.57 Moldova 17 0.36 
Bulgaria 48 1.02 Morocco 48 1.02 
Burkina Faso 8 0.17 Mozambique 21 0.44 
Burundi 9 0.19 Myanmar 2 0.04 
Cambodia 29 0.61 Nepal 43 0.91 
Cameroon 48 1.02 Netherlands 48 1.02 
Cape Verde 33 0.7 New Zealand 48 1.02 
Central African Republic 18 0.38 Nicaragua 29 0.61 
Chad 22 0.47 Niger 26 0.55 
Chile 31 0.66 Nigeria 11 0.23 
China 48 1.02 Norway 48 1.02 
Colombia 43 0.91 Oman 48 1.02 
Comoros 27 0.57 Pakistan 12 0.25 
Congo 13 0.28 Panama 28 0.59 
Costa Rica 48 1.02 Papua New Guinea 33 0.7 
Croatia 17 0.36 Paraguay 15 0.32 
Cuba 48 1.02 Peru 27 0.57 
Cyprus 37 0.78 Philippines 46 0.97 
Czech Republic 15 0.32 Poland 38 0.8 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 7 0.15 Portugal 45 0.95 
Denmark 48 1.02 Qatar 37 0.78 
Djibouti 31 0.66 Romania 47 0.99 
Dominican Republic 43 0.91 Russia 16 0.34 
East Timor 6 0.13 Rwanda 12 0.25 
Ecuador 36 0.76 Saudi Arabia 48 1.02 
Egypt 27 0.57 Senegal 48 1.02 
El Salvador 22 0.47 Sierra Leone 34 0.72 
Equatorial Guinea 11 0.23 Singapore 43 0.91 
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Estonia 17 0.36 Slovakia 15 0.32 
Ethiopia 15 0.32 Slovenia 17 0.36 
Fiji 24 0.51 Solomon Islands 29 0.61 
Finland 48 1.02 Somalia 10 0.21 
France 48 1.02 South Africa 47 0.99 
Gabon 48 1.02 South Korea 20 0.42 
Gambia 29 0.61 Spain 31 0.66 
Germany 18 0.38 Sri Lanka 33 0.7 
Ghana 26 0.55 Sudan 2 0.04 
Greece 41 0.87 Suriname 24 0.51 
Guatemala 23 0.49 Swaziland 40 0.85 
Guinea 24 0.51 Sweden 48 1.02 
Guinea-Bissau 18 0.38 Switzerland 48 1.02 
Guyana 38 0.8 Syria 12 0.25 
Haiti 43 0.91 Tanzania 47 0.99 
Honduras 30 0.63 Thailand 30 0.63 
Hungary 47 0.99 Togo 9 0.19 
India 48 1.02 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 46 0.97 
Indonesia 15 0.32 Tunisia 48 1.02 
Iran 48 1.02 Turkey 41 0.87 
Iraq 23 0.49 Uganda 31 0.66 
Ireland 48 1.02 Ukraine 17 0.36 
Israel 48 1.02 
United Arab 
Emirates 37 0.78 
Italy 48 1.02 United Kingdom 48 1.02 
Ivory Coast 39 0.83 Uruguay 36 0.76 
Jamaica 47 0.99 Venezuela 48 1.02 
Japan 48 1.02 Vietnam 17 0.36 
Jordan 48 1.02 Yugoslavia 2 0.04 
Kenya 45 0.95 Zambia 44 0.93 
Kuwait 40 0.85 Zimbabwe 37 0.78 
Laos 36 0.76    
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Descriptive patterns for H1 and H2 
In addition to presenting the findings from our quantitative models, we explore if our 
hypotheses are supported by patterns in descriptive data. Figure A1 displays the relative 
frequency of regional rebellions for three types of regime transitions: transitions toward 
military regimes, civilian autocracies, and democracies. In the case of transitions to military 
regimes, the mean of Regional rebellion (decay) over the measurement period is 15 and 25 
percent higher than for transitions to civilian autocracy and democracy respectively, suggesting 
that military regimes emerge more often from regional rebellions; second, more transitions to 
military regimes are directly preceded by a regional rebellion than transitions to other regimes; 
third, about 15 percent of all transitions to military regimes occur in countries which at some 
point experienced a regional rebellion, while the equivalent shares in transitions to civilian 
autocracy and democracy lie around 6 and 8 percent respectively. Taken together, the data 
suggest that, in line with H1, regime transitions in the wake of regional rebellions are more 
likely to yield military rule. 
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Figure A1: Regional rebellions and regime transitions 
Note: “Previously experienced regional rebellions” means occurrence of a regional rebellion 
at some point in the past; “directly following regional rebellions” means a regional rebellion 
occurred in the previous year. Data on regime types taken from Svolik (2012); rebellion data 
from Gleditsch et al. (2002).  
 
Figure A2 presents descriptive evidence for our second hypothesis on the intensity of 
regional conflict and the level of regime militarization. It shows that in regimes under direct 
military rule the average years of experienced regional rebellions – the mean of our duration 
measure – is more than three times higher than in democracies, civilian autocracies, or regimes 
under indirect military rules. This is a first indication that more intense regional conflicts leads 
to greater militarization of regimes in the form of direct military rule.  
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Figure A2: Intensity of regional conflict and regime militarization 
 
Note: Data on regime types taken from Svolik (2012); rebellion data from Gleditsch et al. 
(2002).  
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Modelling military regime democratization 
While military regimes have, on average, had shorter spells than other regime types (Geddes 
1999a), there is actually considerable variation across military regimes, for which our theory 
provides a potential explanation (Croissant and Kuehn 2016; Kim and Kroeger 2018). Our third 
hypothesis is thus as follows: Our theoretical argument implies that regional rebellions prompt 
militaries to hold on to power longer rather than handing it back quickly to civilian elites as 
their motivation and capacity to do so is stronger. Specifically, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: Military regimes arising in the wake of regional rebellions or exposed to regional 
rebellions during their spell should withstand pressures for democratization longer than 
other military regimes. 
In terms of descriptive statistics, Figure A3 depicts the average duration of military 
regimes in years differentiated by whether they experienced regional rebellions. In line with 
our expectations in H3, the average duration of all military regimes that have experienced some 
form of regional rebellion is noticeably higher: military regimes that previously experienced a 
regional rebellion last on average four years longer; regimes that directly emerge in the wake 
of a regional rebellion last over six years longer; and military regimes facing a regional 
rebellion during their spell last about two years longer. On the whole, the patterns emerging 
from the descriptive statistics are in line with our theory and inspire confidence in our theory.  
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Figure A3: Regional rebellions and military regime duration 
 
Note: “Previously experienced regional rebellions” means occurrence of a regional rebellion 
at some point in the past; “directly following regional rebellions” means a regional rebellion 
occurred in the previous year; “experienced regional rebellion during spell” means at least one 
regional rebellion occurred during the regime spell. Data on regime types taken from Svolik 
2012; rebellion data from Gleditsch et al. 2002. 
 
To model the effect of regional rebellions on military regimes’ ability to withstand 
democratization (H3) we use a variant of our Markov transition model presented above. Based 
on the theory-generating Southeast Asian cases, we hypothesize two scenarios for military 
regimes to become more resistant to democracy through regional rebellion: first, military 
regimes that either directly emerge out of a regional rebellion – that is, experience one in the 
year preceding regime onset – or that were preceded by regional rebellions at some point in the 
past become more resilient in the face of democratizing forces as the preceding conflict has 
galvanized military elites into a cohesive ruling group; second, military regimes that experience 
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regional rebellions during their spell should also be more resistant to democracy as the cohesion 
of the ruling group is enhanced by conflict. Note that in the latter case military regimes could 
have come to power for reasons other than regional rebellions but then subsequently become 
more resilient as a result of regional rebellion.  
To capture the foundational effect of preceding regional rebellions, we create two new 
variables, henceforth called origin variables: Previously experienced regional rebellion is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 if a military regime was preceded by a regional rebellion 
at some point before its onset; Directly following regional rebellion is also a binary variable 
indicating whether or not a military regime was preceded by a regional rebellion in the period 
immediately prior to regime onset. Both variables are time-invariant for the duration of a 
military regime spell. The effect of rebellions occurring during a spell are captured by our 
standard decay variables. In terms of the model specification, we follow the setup of the 
Markov transition model with the exception that we now model the transition from a military 
regime to democracy. The equation is as follows:  
Pr(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑀𝑖𝑙.  𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3 +
𝛽4𝜗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡), (3) 
with 𝛼 designating the constant, R our measures of regional rebellions (origin and 
during spell), X a vector of covariates, and 𝛿 regional fixed effects. The event counter 𝜗 
measures the number of previous regime breakdowns, while 𝜇 designates cubic polynomials 
of the time since military regime onset. As before, we lag all variables except for the event 
counter and the regional fixed effects,1 and estimate a pooled as well as a fixed effects logit 
 
1 Although our origin variables are time-invariant, we use the one-year lag to bring them in line with the lag 
structure of the model. Using the contemporaneous version of these variables yields nearly identical results. 
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model. In the latter, the origin variables are not estimated as they are time-variant so that the 
model uniquely focuses on the effect of regional rebellions occurring during a military spell.2 
Our regressions results are displayed in Table A4. Columns 1 and 2 report the pooled 
logit estimates of the origin variables, while column 3 shows the estimates for rebellions 
occurring during a regime spell only. Columns 4 and 5 show the results when both measures 
of rebellion are added simultaneously into the regression. The conditional logit results are 
shown in Column 6. On the whole, the findings partially support H3. On the one hand, 
rebellions occurring during regime spells significantly reduce the likelihood of a transition to 
democracy. Given a baseline probability of democratization of 3.3 percent in the pooled model, 
the occurrence of a regional rebellions reduces this probability on average by 1.5 percent 
absolutely and 45 percent relatively speaking. The effect then fades out over the five following 
periods (see Figure A4). The conditional logit model which focuses solely on within regime 
variation yields a similarly, slightly stronger finding as significance levels increase. 
 
 
2 We also tested another variant of the Markov model where we keep Military regime as our dependent variable 
and condition on Military regimet-1 =1. While this model slightly shifts the focus from democratization to 
military regime breakdown more generally, the main finding is the same in that regional rebellions during 
regime spells increase the durability of military regimes. Results are available upon request. 
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Figure A4: Effect of regional rebellion on military regime democratization 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table A4, column 5. Regional rebellion set at 1, 0.5, 0.25, 
0.125, and 0.0625 according to decay function. All other covariates set at their observed values 
(Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
 
On the other hand, our expectation that regimes emerging out of, or in contexts preceded 
by regional rebellions are more stable, does not bear out. In fact, all signs are positive except 
in column 1. The results of column 5 suggest that regimes directly following a regional 
rebellion are more likely to break down than regimes without previous rebellions. This finding 
is somewhat surprising in light of the suggestive descriptive statistics presented at the outset of 
this section. We see two possible reasons for this: First, with a total of three cases (Indonesia, 
Mauritania, Myanmar), military regimes arising directly in the wake of regional rebellion are 
relatively rare in our data, and while their spell is comparatively long (32, 26, and 47 years 
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respectively), the model might struggle to produce clear results from so few positive 
observations. Second, a number of regimes are double-coded as having both regional and 
center-seeking rebellions prior to their onset (see Table A3). This is, amongst others, the case 
for Myanmar – one of the most long-lasting military dictatorships. As a result, differentiating 
the effect of center-seeking and regional rebellions at the origin of military regimes is 
complicated because of tied data.3 Conversely, given that these tied data bias the results against 
our hypotheses more generally, the fact that in all our models Regional decay has been highly 
significant makes us more confident in the validity of our findings.  
 
Table A3: Regimes with both types of rebellion 
Previously experienced 
regional AND center-
seeking rebellion 
Directly following 
regional AND center-
seeking rebellion 
Comoros (3) Myanmar (46) 
D. R. Congo (26, 3)  
Ethiopia (15, 2)  
Indonesia (32)  
Myanmar (45)  
Niger (1)  
Nigeria (12, 14)  
Pakistan (8)  
Note: Duration of military regime spell in brackets.  
 
3 In additional tests, we experimented with recoding all tied origin variables as regional rebellions only. This 
removes the positive significant effect of the regional origin variable but still does not show a negative 
significant effect on democratization. Results are available upon request.    
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Table A4: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   2.161   
 (1.190)   (1.816)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -0.018   
 (0.861)   (1.378)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   2.212  
  (0.879)   (0.965)**  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.775  
  (1.483)   (1.343)  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -2.613 -3.884 -1.808 -24.995 
   (1.496)* (1.858)** (0.975)* (6.222)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   1.713 1.930 1.625 -1.636 
   (1.006)* (1.513) (1.131) (2.287) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 0.088 0.497 0.471 0.165 0.558 -1.891 
 (0.807) (1.146) (0.973) (0.765) (0.964) (8.406) 
Population size (log) t-1 -1.501 -0.628 -0.881 -1.361 -0.382 9.899 
 (1.380) (1.180) (1.247) (1.211) (1.002) (6.658) 
Polity t-1 0.814 0.786 0.829 0.854 0.802 1.528 
 (0.099)*** (0.110)*** (0.119)*** (0.134)*** (0.103)*** (0.678)** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 34.619 14.964 22.660 30.100 9.588 365.337 
 (29.913) (23.793) (26.368) (25.568) (21.430) (347.806) 
Unrest (log) t-1 -0.184 -0.684 -0.187 -0.139 -0.678 -3.729 
 (0.595) (0.661) (0.586) (0.552) (0.554) (3.063) 
War (dummy) t-1 -1.963 -2.434 -2.892 -2.906 -3.342 -3.161 
 (1.387) (1.410)* (1.486)* (1.578)* (1.470)** (2.580) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 4.988 5.747 5.961 5.741 6.710  
 (2.925)* (2.132)*** (2.871)** (2.865)** (2.426)***  
Number of previous regime failures 0.697 0.805 0.671 0.767 0.911 -2.812 
 (0.385)* (0.419)* (0.328)** (0.459)* (0.370)** (1.452)* 
N 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.
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Separation plots to assess model fit 
The two below figures show separation plots for our two baseline models. Separation 
plots arrange the fitted values in ascending order of probability with each line 
representing one observation (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011). Red lines are 
observations in which the outcome of interest actually occurs. The added line 
represents the predicted probabilities estimated for each observation. The small 
triangle beneath the plot indicates the expected number of total events predicted. A 
perfectly fitted model would thus have red and yellow lines perfectly separated at the 
position of the triangle, with a sharp corresponding rise in the predicted probability 
line. A very bad model would see the occurrence of actual outcomes at even very low 
levels of predicted probability and a slow gradual increase of the probability line. 
Bearing this in mind, the graphs below demonstrate a good model fit with high levels 
of separation and a visible spike in the predicted probability at the triangle separation 
point. 
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Note: Figure based on column 4, Table 1 in the main article.  
 
 
Note: Figure based on column 3, Table A4 in the Online Appendix.  
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General note on robustness tests 
The below section includes the following tests: additional/alternative variables, 
diffusion effects, and alternative time specifications. The tests are carried out for our 
military regime emergence and democratization models. Wherever possible, these 
tests are also carried out for our multinomial logit model of regime militarization.  
 
Mundlak-Chamberlain models 
As an alternative to our conditional logistic fixed effects regressions, we estimate the 
effect of rebellions on the emergence and democratization of military regimes using 
the Mundlak-Chamberlain (Chamberlain 1982; Mundlak 1978) approach. The model 
takes the following functional form:  
Pr(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑅?̅?) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑋?̅?) + 𝛽3𝑅?̅? +
𝛽4𝑋?̅? + +𝛽5𝑌?̅? + 𝛿3 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡),  (1),  
where 𝛼 designates the constant, R our measure of regional rebellions, X a vector 
of covariates (including our event count variable), and 𝛿 regional fixed effects. By 
adding the country means and the yearly deviation from the country means, the model 
enables us to separate cross-country from within-country effects. Note that in Table 
A6 we refrain from adding the yearly deviation for the variables measuring the 
rebellion prior or at regime onset (Previously experienced regional/center-seeking 
rebellion; directly following regional/center-seeking rebellion) as these are highly 
collinear with our standard measure of Regional/Center-seeking rebellion. 
Additionally, we add the country mean of our dependent variable Y, which allows us 
to account for unit heterogeneity by, effectively, adding a varying intercept (Wright, 
Frantz, and Geddes 2015). We also add 𝜇, a vector of cubic time polynomials to 
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account for duration dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). As before, all variables 
except for regional fixed effects and the event counter are lagged by one year to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns and ensure the correct order of causal dependence.  
The results for military regime emergence are shown in Table A5. In line with our 
baseline model, the model finds that within-country changes of regional rebellions 
significantly increase the likelihood of military regime emergence. The effect is 
illustrated in the marginal effects plot in Figure A5. By contrast, cross-country 
differences in the average level of regional rebellions are not associated with a higher 
likelihood of military regime emergence, suggesting that our finding is driven by 
within-country variation of regional rebellions over time.  
The results for military regime democratization are shown in Table A6. None of 
the variables for regional rebellions is significant. As we explain in the article, this is 
most probably due to tied data for regimes that experience both a regional and a center-
seeking rebellion prior to regime onset.  
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Table A5: Mundlak-Chamberlain estimation of military regime emergence 
 (1) (2) 
Regional rebellion (decay, mean) -0.558 -0.682 
 (0.979) (1.569) 
Regional rebellion t-1 (decay, dev) 1.607 1.308 
 (0.762)** (0.755)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay, mean) 1.476 0.496 
 (0.671)** (0.649) 
Center-seeking rebellion t-1 (decay, dev) 0.391 0.077 
 (0.540) (0.607) 
GDP p.c. (log, mean) -0.042 -0.218 
 (0.286) (0.261) 
GDP p.c. t-1 (log, dev) -0.036 -0.071 
 (0.533) (0.553) 
Population size (log, mean) 0.201 0.292 
 (0.292) (0.300) 
Population size t-1 (log, dev) 2.661 3.659 
 (0.849)*** (0.876)*** 
Polity (mean) 0.043 0.162 
 (0.050) (0.078)** 
Polity t-1 (dev) -0.265 -0.365 
 (0.050)*** (0.064)*** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root, mean) -7.251 -5.096 
 (8.429) (7.096) 
Mil. capabilities t-1 (cube root, dev) -16.044 -18.931 
 (18.689) (19.885) 
Unrest (log, mean) 0.881 1.008 
 (0.769) (0.671) 
Unrest t-1 (log, dev) 0.215 -0.012 
 (0.203) (0.226) 
War (dummy, mean) 4.432 3.892 
 (3.496) (2.916) 
War t-1 (dummy, dev) 0.746 -0.027 
 (0.741) (0.886) 
Rel. fractionalization (mean) -0.793 -0.211 
 (0.841) (0.725) 
Previous failures (mean) 0.147 -0.011 
 (0.029)*** (0.043) 
Previous failures (dev) -0.191 -0.128 
 (0.031)*** (0.022)*** 
Y (mean)  8.353 
  (1.720)*** 
NxT 4,630 4,630 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Mundlak-Chamberlain logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Mean designates the country averages, dev designates the annual 
deviation from country averages. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure A5: Effect of within-country changes in regional rebellions 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table A5, column 1. All other covariates set at 
their observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).  
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Table A6: Mundlak-Chamberlain estimation of military regime democratization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion (mean) 2.777   10.831  
 (3.403)   (9.747)  
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion (mean) -1.022   -5.283  
 (1.256)   (3.448)  
Directly following regional rebellion (mean)  0.901   -18.083 
  (4.173)   (32.346) 
Directly following center-seeking rebellion (mean)  -1.847   -3.842 
  (2.227)   (5.472) 
Regional rebellion (decay, mean)   -4.167 -18.157 8.392 
   (8.185) (14.272) (21.409) 
Regional rebellion t-1 (decay, dev)   -30.648 -6.200 -71.368 
   (43.700) (13.656) (54.773) 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay, mean)   11.036 20.118 19.620 
   (7.938) (10.891)* (9.216)** 
Center-seeking rebellion t-1 (decay, dev)   2.886 3.987 2.456 
   (1.757) (2.431) (1.736) 
Y (mean) 44.420 51.410 -30.814 -41.172 -93.795 
 (40.531) (47.585) (38.599) (48.098) (64.942) 
NxT 1,166 1,151 1,166 1,166 1,151 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak-Chamberlain logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean designates the country averages, dev 
designates the annual deviation from country averages. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Dummy instead of decaying variables for rebellion 
To ascertain that our findings are not purely an artefact of our decaying measure of 
rebellions, we re-run our baseline models for military regime emergence and 
democratization using a simple dummy indicator of rebellion. The variable measures 
if a regional or center-seeking rebellion occurred in the previous year. The results are 
shown in Table A7 and Table A8.  
As expected, constraining the effect of rebellions to one period weakens the 
association between regional rebellions and military regime emergence and 
democratization. That said, the pattern we have seen when using decaying variables 
reemerges when using simple dummies: In Table A7, only columns 4 and 5 are slightly 
insignificant, but with p=0.105 and 0.125 respectively reasonably close given that we 
are using a much coarser measure of regional rebellions. And in Table A8, we find a 
similar pattern to our baseline democratization model, suggesting that regional 
rebellions occurring during a military regime spell significantly decrease the 
likelihood of democratization. This is particularly the case when focusing on within-
country variation only (Table A8, column 6), which is, as we know from Table A5, 
the main driver of our finding.  
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Table A7: Regional rebellions (dummy) and military regime emergence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (dummy) t-1 0.849 0.859 0.750 0.709 1.421 
 (0.457)* (0.455)* (0.455)* (0.438) (0.920) 
Center-seeking rebellion (dummy) t-1 0.422 0.422 0.320 0.281 0.918 
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.317) (0.324) (0.610) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.166 -0.167 -0.179 0.001 -0.952 
 (0.240) (0.239) (0.235) (0.267) (0.852) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.057 0.058 0.006 0.379 2.455 
 (0.126) (0.123) (0.122) (0.213)* (2.106) 
Polity t-1 -0.125 -0.126 -0.140 -0.152 -0.408 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.098)*** 
Previous failures 0.181 0.182 0.156 0.114 -0.926 
 (0.211) (0.212) (0.235) (0.249) (0.945) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.114 0.054 0.385 0.383 
  (0.766) (0.746) (0.734) (1.053) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.483 0.519 -0.102 
   (0.150)*** (0.153)*** (0.306) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.562 -1.678  
   (0.692)** (0.746)**  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.067 -12.692 
    (5.041)** (32.218) 
NxT 4,704 4,704 4,613 4,612 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A8: Regional rebellions (dummy) and military regime democratization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   1.575   
 (1.190)   (1.421)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   0.611   
 (0.861)   (1.053)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   1.686  
  (0.879)   (0.983)*  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.374  
  (1.483)   (1.582)  
Regional rebellion (dummy) t-1   -2.286 -3.422 -1.233 -16.375 
   (1.491) (1.765)* (1.023) (2.434)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (dummy) t-1   1.160 1.047 0.822 -3.039 
   (1.116) (1.364) (1.338) (2.106) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 0.088 0.497 0.388 0.209 0.490 -4.731 
 (0.807) (1.146) (0.942) (0.754) (1.034) (7.567) 
Population size (log) t-1 -1.501 -0.628 -0.949 -1.368 -0.523 7.758 
 (1.380) (1.180) (1.215) (1.268) (1.032) (10.625) 
Polity t-1 0.814 0.786 0.815 0.821 0.790 1.989 
 (0.099)*** (0.110)*** (0.109)*** (0.105)*** (0.101)*** (0.750)*** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 34.619 14.964 23.762 30.289 12.450 481.046 
 (29.913) (23.793) (25.888) (27.057) (21.284) (291.278)* 
Unrest (log) t-1 -0.184 -0.684 -0.170 -0.131 -0.657 -4.846 
 (0.595) (0.661) (0.599) (0.584) (0.607) (2.408)** 
War (dummy) t-1 -1.963 -2.434 -2.583 -2.744 -2.903 -4.279 
 (1.387) (1.410)* (1.567)* (1.582)* (1.568)* (2.346)* 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 4.988 5.747 5.707 5.148 6.195  
 (2.925)* (2.132)*** (2.746)** (2.855)* (2.242)***  
Number of previous regime failures 0.697 0.805 0.638 0.763 0.852 -2.662 
 (0.385)* (0.419)* (0.318)** (0.367)** (0.412)** (1.451)* 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
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Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Using coups as dependent variable 
As we argue in the paper, the concept of militarization overlaps with but is not identical to 
military coups. To test the degree of overlap empirically, we rerun our baseline logit model 
using a binary indicator for coups instead of militarized regimes as our dependent variable. 
We test coup data from the Powell and Thyne (2011) (column 1) and Marshall and Marshall 
(2014) (column 2). We would expect the direction of the sign and strength of the sign to be 
similar. This is precisely what Table A9 shows. Like in our baseline model, the coefficient 
of Regional rebellion is positive; the association is slightly weaker when using the Powell 
and Thyne dataset with p=0.15. 
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Table A9: Regional rebellions and military coups 
 (1) (2) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.384 0.514 
 (0.264) (0.260)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.238 0.297 
 (0.153) (0.138)** 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.358 -0.397 
 (0.100)*** (0.090)*** 
Population size (log) t-1 0.006 -0.069 
 (0.109) (0.098) 
Polity t-1 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
War (dummy) t-1 -0.099 0.169 
 (0.410) (0.332) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.303 0.336 
 (0.106)*** (0.093)*** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -0.278 -0.071 
 (0.299) (0.288) 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -1.573 -2.121 
 (2.660) (2.621) 
Number of previous coups 0.002 0.014 
 (0.019) (0.021) 
NxT 6,263 6,260 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 
uses the Powell and Thyne data; column 2 uses the Marshall and Marshall data * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Testing the effect of rebellion distance to capital 
The proposed disalignment mechanism implies strong information asymmetries between 
civilian and military elites as a result of the distance between the regional rebellion and urban 
centers, especially the capital. An observable implication of this mechanism is that the effect 
of regional rebellions on the likelihood of military regime emergence should increase the 
farther the rebellion is away from the capital. We test this corollary using the geocoded 
version of the PRIO conflict dataset (1946-2005; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; 
Gleditsch et al. 2002). The new distance-weighted variables measure the distance of a 
rebellion from the capital city, with 0 indicating no rebellion, 1 a rebellion in the capital city, 
and further integers signifying larger distances from the capital. The results are shown in 
Table A10 below and strongly confirm our prior. The coefficient of Regional rebellion is 
strongly positively significant, meaning the farther a rebel a regional rebellion is away from 
the capital, the more likely the emergence of a military regime becomes. This effect is 
illustrated graphically in below. Interestingly, while the effect is only weakly significant, 
even center-seeking rebellion begin to exhibit a similar pattern once their distance to the 
capital city is taken into account and, as our theory predicts, information asymmetries 
become more salient.  
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Table A10: Rebellion distance and military regime emergence 
 (1) 
Regional rebellion (distance-weighted) t-1 0.001 
 (0.000)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (distance-weighted) t-1 0.004 
 (0.002)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.009 
 (0.280) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.402 
 (0.211)* 
Polity t-1 -0.160 
 (0.038)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.042 
 (0.733) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.488 
 (0.167)*** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.756 
 (0.786)** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -10.661 
 (5.053)** 
Previous failures 0.144 
 (0.234) 
NxT 4,612 
Time polynomials Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
Pooled logit model with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure A6: Capital distance of rebellions and militarized regimes 
 
Note: Marginal effects derived from Table A10, column 1. All other covariates set at their 
observed values (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
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Instrumental variable approach 
A potential source of bias is endogeneity and reversed causality. Military repression, for 
example, might aggravate regional grievances, thus leading to regional rebellions rather than 
vice-versa. Indeed, Fjelde (2010) finds that military regimes are more likely to become 
involved in civil wars. Moreover, both regional rebellions and military regimes might be 
jointly associated with an uncontrolled omitted confounder. Depending on the strength of 
endogeneity and/or reverse causality, both scenarios could considerably bias our findings. 
The standard econometric approach to this problem has been to use instrumental variables. 
Finding instruments that are both sufficiently predictive and only influence the outcome Y 
through its effect on X (exclusion restriction) is often challenging, however (Bollen 2012; 
Sovey and Green 2011). In our case, this challenge is aggravated by the fact that we need to 
instrument for two endogenous predictors as both regional and center-seeking rebellions can 
plausibly be considered endogenous and/or in a reverse-causal relationship with military 
regimes. 
We believe to have identified two instruments that fulfil the stringent conditions for 
instrumental variables: First, taking into account the emphasis the civil war literature has 
placed on the geographical conditions conducive to civil wars (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003), 
we turn to terrain characteristics as an instrument. Both center-seeking and separatist rebels 
will have to hide at times from government forces, which can be greatly facilitated or 
complicated by the shape of the terrain. The varying availability of hideouts is thus likely to 
play some role in the decision of whether or not to mount a rebellion. We therefore use 
Rugged terrain in (thousands of) ha (log) t-1 taken from Nunn and Puga (2012) as our first 
instrument. Second, building on the insights from diffusion arguments of macro-social 
outcomes (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Miller 2015), we use the number of Battle-related 
deaths in neighboring countries t-1 as an instrument for regional and center-seeking 
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rebellion. Our logic relies on an implicit deterrence mechanism from large-scale human 
losses in neighboring countries on potential rebels.  Neighborhood is defined as all 
contiguous states not separated by more than 24 miles of water.4 We use the Correlates of 
War Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002, v3.2) to construct these variables. 
Could it be that that terrain characteristics and battle-related deaths in the neighborhood 
have a direct effect on military regime emergence or breakdown that is not mediated by 
domestic rebellion? Existing theory does not suggest this. Geography can plausibly be 
considered as exogenous. As for the second instrument, violence in neighboring countries 
could certainly increase the readiness of domestic military units in order to prevent spill-
over effects; yet the mechanisms that would lead from, say, increased border patrols to a 
military takeover seem to be rather obscure.  
Technically, we conduct our instrumental variable regression using a limited-
information maximum likelihood estimator (LIML) as such estimators have been shown to 
be more robust to weak instrumental variable bias (Stock and Yogo 2005).5 Fortunately, all 
our F statistics meet the Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value on instrument strength. This 
suggests a rather strong predictive power of our instruments, so that any potential weak 
instrument bias will be limited. The results of the IV regressions are shown in Table A11. 
In line with our baseline model, regional rebellions remain a strong predictor for the 
emergence of military regimes. We do not recover, however, our previous finding regarding 
military regime democratization: while the sign of regional rebellion remains negative, the 
coefficient is far from statistical significance. This emphasizes the merely indicative nature 
of our finding on democratization at this stage.   
 
4 This is one of the possible operationalizations of contiguity proposed in the dataset. Results are similar for 
alternative definitions of contiguity and are available upon request.  
5 We use the ivreg2 command in Stata to run these regressions. 
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Table A11: Regional conflict and military regime emergence/democratization (IV 
approach) 
 (1) (2) 
Second stage outcome Military regime 
emergence 
Military regime 
democratization 
   
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.232** -0.0434 
 (0.112) (0.180) 
   
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 -0.201 0.0274 
 (0.151) (0.0787) 
First stage outcome Regional rebellion 
decay t-1 
Regional rebellion 
decay t-1 
   
Battle-related deaths in neighboring countries t-1 -0.004*** -0.0084** 
 (0.0015) (0.004) 
   
Rugged terrain in ha (log) t-1 0.0054 0.0085 
 (0.0033) (0.0069) 
First stage outcome Center-seeking 
rebellion decay t-1 
Center-seeking 
rebellion decay t-1 
   
Battle-related deaths in neighboring countries t-1 0.0015 0.0020 
 (0.0022) (0.0058) 
   
Rugged terrain in ha (log) t-1 0.0065** 0.0441*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0159) 
N x T second stage 4,889 1,093 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  7.73 11.62 
Stock-Yogo critical value 7.03 7.03 
Two-stage instrumental variable regression with limited-information maximum likelihood 
estimator (LIML) and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic and the Stock-Yogo critical values are taken from a model assuming 
conditional homoscedasticity as the Stock-Yogo test is only valid in the presence of i.i.d. 
errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Additional control variables 
As it is standard practice, we test the robustness of our baseline models to the addition of 
further control variables. Specifically, we add Oil rents (log) (Ross 2013), Population 
density (UNDP 2015), Trade/GDP (World Bank 2017), a dummy for the post-Cold War 
period (Post Cold War), and a measure of the prior regime type (Prior regime) (Svolik 2012) 
to the regression. The latter is a categorical variable measuring if a regime is autocratic, 
democratic, or there was no authority. These additional variables aim to take into account 
that (i) military regimes might be more likely to emerge in resource-abundant countries; (ii) 
civilian involvement in counter-insurgency might be more likely in more densely populated 
areas, decreasing the likelihood of military regime emergence; (iii) more open economies 
might exhibit more volatile business cycles, ensuing instability and potentially military take-
overs or regime breakdowns; (iv) military regimes might be less likely to emerge in the post-
Cold War era; and (v) certain regime types might be more likely to transition into military 
rule. We run all these regressions using Ethnic fractionalization instead of religious 
fractionalization as control variable to make sure our findings are robust to ethnic diversity 
(Alesina et al. 2003).  
In the light of the results displayed in Table A12-Table A14, our main findings appear 
practically unchanged by these additional variables. Regional rebellions remain a highly 
significant predictor of military take-overs; and regional rebellions occurring during a 
regime spell tend to decrease the likelihood of military regime democratization. The latter 
finding seems to be particularly driven by within-country variation (see the conditional logit 
model in Table A14, column 6). As before, our expectation that regimes emerging out of or 
in contexts of regional rebellions is not supported by the model, as shown by the positive 
significant effect for Previously experienced regional rebellion and Directly following 
regional rebellion. As we discussed in the article, while we are puzzled by these findings in 
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the light of strong descriptive patterns, the absence of a clear finding might have to do with 
the effect of ties in our data.   
As for the multinomial logit model on regime militarization (Table A13), the effect of 
rebellion intensity remains highly significant in the unrestricted sample (column 1). In the 
restricted sample (column 2) for military regimes only, the coefficient of Duration of 
regional rebellion becomes slightly insignificant (p=0.155). At the same, we lose about 150 
observations in this regression compared to our baseline model, which is likely to be driving 
the loss of significance.  
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Table A12: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (additional controls) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.923 0.950 1.159 1.129 0.913 2.041 
 (0.420)** (0.416)** (0.478)** (0.488)** (0.536)* (1.022)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.171 0.200 0.256 0.293 0.147 1.366 
 (0.353) (0.354) (0.379) (0.380) (0.428) (0.943) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1 1.175 0.736 0.665 0.698 1.099  
 (0.738) (0.742) (0.772) (0.773) (0.732)  
Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.082 -0.088 -0.043 -0.041 -0.064 0.372 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.396) 
Pop. density t-1  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.039 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.053) 
Trade/GDP t-1   -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 0.010 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
Post Cold War    -0.408 -0.524 -0.540 
    (0.355) (0.365) (1.062) 
Prior regime: Autocracy t-1     -1.434 0.256 
(baseline cat.: democracy)     (0.713)** (0.953) 
Prior regime: No authority t-1     -0.819 -0.516 
(baseline cat.: democracy)     (0.997) (1.615) 
NxT 4,605 4,605 4,092 4,092 4,092 1,099 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A13: Regional rebellions and regime militarization (additional controls) 
  (1) (2) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.041  
Military  (0.043)  
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.018  
  (0.029)  
 Ethnic fractionalization t-1 -0.027  
  (0.632)  
 Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.003  
  (0.057)  
 Pop. density t-1 -0.000  
  (0.001)  
 Trade/GDP t-1 0.003  
  (0.004)  
 Post Cold War 0.191  
  (0.269)  
 Prior regime: Autocracy t-1 0.165  
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.355)  
 Prior regime: No authority t-1 -1.234  
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.588)**  
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.117 0.073 
Military  (0.028)*** (0.051) 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.108 -0.125 
  (0.034)*** (0.049)** 
 Ethnic fractionalization t-1 -0.430 -0.324 
  (1.029) (1.303) 
 Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.131 -0.141 
  (0.088) (0.117) 
 Pop. density t-1 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
 Trade/GDP t-1 -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
 Post Cold War -0.906 -1.181 
  (0.443)** (0.538)** 
 Prior regime: Autocracy t-1 -0.042 -0.669 
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.386) (0.456) 
 Prior regime: No authority t-1 -0.817 -0.103 
 (baseline cat.: democracy) (0.704) (0.650) 
NxT 5,355 1,057 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Column 1 unrestricted 
sample, base category: non-military regimes. Column 2 restricted sample on military 
regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table A14: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (additional variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 4.324   7.108   
 (2.125)**   (2.027)***   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.368   -1.079   
 (0.721)   (0.972)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  9.346   6.067  
  (4.266)**   (1.875)***  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  3.213   3.682  
  (1.896)*   (2.057)*  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -0.451 -3.883 5.356 -97.412 
   (1.296) (1.544)** (5.679) (44.847)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   1.997 2.601 -1.628 -9.563 
   (1.578) (2.153) (1.804) (7.867) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1 5.538 7.816 4.679 4.846 9.420  
 (3.747) (4.158)* (3.292) (3.489) (4.908)*  
Oil rents (log) t-1 -0.805 -1.778 -0.596 -0.988 -2.048 -2.511 
 (0.324)** (0.786)** (0.291)** (0.352)*** (0.916)** (1.526)* 
Pop. density t-1 0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.001 1.316 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.722)* 
Trade/GDP t-1 -0.022 -0.028 -0.006 -0.030 -0.045  
 (0.017) (0.010)*** (0.012) (0.015)** (0.019)**  
Post Cold War -1.354 -3.513 -2.148 -0.858 -3.959 12.621 
 (0.994) (2.303) (1.050)** (0.764) (2.762) (7.103)* 
NxT 1,029 900 1,029 1,029 900 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reginal dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Controlling for diffusion effects  
There is ample evidence that democratization is driven, in part, by regional diffusion 
effects (e.g. Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Patel, Bunce, and 
Wolchik 2014). Similar dynamics can be imagined for the emergence of specific 
authoritarian regime types, such as military regimes. To ensure that our findings are 
not driven by diffusion, we control for the percentage of military regimes in 
neighborhood in our emergence regressions, and the percentage of democratic 
regimes in neighborhood for our democratization models. Neighborhood is defined as 
all contiguous states not separated by more than 24 miles of water. We use the 
Correlates of War Direct Contiguity dataset to construct these variables (Stinnett et al. 
2002, v3.2). The results of this robustness test, shown in Table A15-Table A17, are 
substantively identical to those from our baseline models.  
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Table A15: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (diffusion 
effects) 
 (1) (2) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.861 2.241 
 (0.445)* (0.986)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 -0.034 0.851 
 (0.328) (0.702) 
% mil. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-
1 
1.487 4.243 
 (0.407)*** (1.209)*** 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.116 -0.781 
 (0.298) (0.745) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.062 3.500 
 (0.284) (1.921)* 
Polity t-1 -0.156 -0.412 
 (0.036)*** (0.110)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.324 0.375 
 (0.742) (1.049) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.477 -0.031 
 (0.170)*** (0.285) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.470  
 (0.739)**  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -0.031 -13.701 
 (8.033) (33.551) 
Previous failures 0.084 -1.731 
 (0.253) (0.822)** 
NxT 4,292 1,205 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in column 1. Conditional logit model in column 2. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table A16: Regional rebellions and regime militarization (diffusion effects) 
  (1) (2) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.008  
Military  (0.041)  
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.011  
  (0.031)  
 % mil. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-1 1.143  
  (0.431)***  
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.116 0.116 
Military  (0.027)*** (0.051)** 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.142 -0.143 
  (0.030)*** (0.052)*** 
 % mil. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-1 1.257 0.053 
  (0.476)*** (0.593) 
NxT 5,355 1,057 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Column 1 unrestricted 
sample, base category: non-military regimes. Column 2 restricted sample on military 
regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A17: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (diffusion effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.809   2.208   
 (2.069)   (2.460)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 1.373   0.624   
 (0.999)   (1.595)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.240   1.854  
  (0.977)   (1.367)  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.115   -0.667  
  (1.577)   (1.461)  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -2.640 -4.084 -1.583 -21.809 
   (1.494)* (2.212)* (1.195) (3.192)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   1.832 1.759 1.511 -1.682 
   (1.060)* (1.488) (1.423) (1.988) 
% dem. regimes in neighborhood (contiguous) t-1 -1.074 1.307 -0.773 -1.037 0.134 10.784 
 (1.919) (2.009) (1.839) (1.877) (2.455) (3.794)*** 
NxT 1,146 1,003 1,146 1,146 1,003 457 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
 
43 
 
Alternative times specifications 
We test the sensitivity of our baseline models to alternative time specifications in 
Table A18-Table A20 below. Specifically, we rerun the models using cubic splines, 
the log of time, and decade dummies with time polynomials. Our main findings remain 
substantively unchanged.  
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Table A18: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (alternative time specifications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit Clogit Logit Clogit Logit Clogit 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.940 2.309 0.931 2.358 0.913 2.303 
 (0.428)** (1.004)** (0.424)** (0.910)*** (0.424)** (1.197)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.324 1.147 0.205 1.049 0.392 0.916 
 (0.346) (0.749) (0.349) (0.674) (0.349) (0.846) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.005 -0.876 0.016 -0.244 -0.012 -1.017 
 (0.269) (0.836) (0.257) (0.750) (0.273) (0.953) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.362 2.820 0.380 4.827 0.371 1.776 
 (0.212)* (2.020) (0.211)* (1.977)** (0.223)* (2.269) 
Polity t-1 -0.152 -0.420 -0.161 -0.379 -0.135 -0.390 
 (0.036)*** (0.096)*** (0.035)*** (0.083)*** (0.037)*** (0.104)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.379 0.368 0.319 0.363 0.306 0.197 
 (0.728) (1.084) (0.753) (0.994) (0.745) (0.911) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.544 -0.071 0.533 -0.064 0.507 -0.154 
 (0.154)*** (0.308) (0.153)*** (0.274) (0.155)*** (0.299) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.691  -1.689  -1.450  
 (0.747)**  (0.751)**  (0.752)*  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -10.215 -19.317 -10.535 -32.703 -11.705 -22.140 
 (5.011)** (29.699) (4.923)** (33.536) (5.220)** (37.913) 
Previous failures 0.165 -1.001 0.104 -1.863 0.463 -1.542 
 (0.242) (1.002) (0.262) (0.938)** (0.293) (0.942) 
NxT 4,630 1,301 4,630 1,301 4,630 1,301 
Cubic splines Yes Yes No No No No 
Log of time No No Yes Yes No No 
Decade dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Time polynomials No No No No Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1, 3, and 5. Conditional logit model in column 2, 4, and 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A19: Regional rebellions and regime militarization (alternative time specifications) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indirect Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.019 0.015 0.021    
Military  (0.046) (0.042) (0.036)    
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018    
  (0.033) (0.031) (0.029)    
Direct Duration of regional rebellion t-1 0.119 0.120 0.112 0.116 0.116 0.098 
Military  (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.050)** (0.050)** (0.037)*** 
 Duration of center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.142 -0.148 -0.150 -0.144 -0.144 -0.142 
  (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)*** (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.041)*** 
NxT 6,052 6,052 6,052 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Cubic splines Yes No No Yes No No 
Log of time No Yes No No Yes No 
Decade dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Time polynomials No No Yes No No Yes 
Regional dummies No No No No No No 
Mil. regime t-1=1 No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multinomial logit regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Columns 1-3 unrestricted sample, base category: non-military regimes. 
Columns 4-6 restricted sample on military regimes only, base category: indirect military rule. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A20: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (alternative time specifications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Logit Logit Clogit Logit Logit Clogit Logit Logit Clogit 
Prev. exp. regional rebellion t-1 2.485   1.486   2.701   
 (1.657)   (1.587)   (1.996)   
Prev. exp. center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.106   -0.029   0.124   
 (1.302)   (1.446)   (0.984)   
Dir. following regional rebellion t-1  2.125   2.184   2.588  
  (0.946)**   (1.210)*   (1.401)*  
Dir. following center-seeking rebellion t-1  -0.354   -0.420   0.284  
  (1.149)   (1.205)   (1.381)  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 -3.963 -1.387 -21.754 -3.437 -1.524 -25.277 -5.335 -3.632 -24.155 
 (1.710)** (0.948) (3.244)*** (1.872)* (1.071) (232.768) (2.854)* (1.726)** (8.595)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 1.924 1.305 -0.142 1.866 1.672 1.378 2.609 2.192 2.146 
 (1.490) (1.128) (1.363) (1.546) (1.137) (1.157) (1.664) (1.312)* (2.299) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 471 1,166 1,023 471 1,166 1,023 478 
Cubic splines Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Log of time No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Decade dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time polynomials No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-2, 4-5, and 7-9. Conditional logit model in column 3, 6, and9. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Alternative measure for military regimes 
The robustness tests below replicate our baseline models using an indicator of military 
regimes based on Geddes et al. (2014). Importantly, we depart from her schema in two 
ways. First, when a regime is classified by her as a hybrid regime, we recode the 
regime according to Lai and Slater (2006), who classify authoritarian regimes as one 
of four types: Strongman, Junta, Bossism, or Machine. We treat the first two types as 
instances of military regimes and the latter two types as party regimes. We make this 
departure from Geddes because her typology measures variation in regime type solely 
by how “access to office and the fruits of office” are allocated; that is, by military 
committee, party committee, or a single individual (Geddes 1999b, 121–122). Yet, 
authoritarian regimes should be differentiated by their executory powers and not just 
by their decision-making procedures. Doing so substantially reduces hybridization in 
the classification of all regime types. 
Second, and by similar reasoning, we recode regimes classified as purely 
personalist by Geddes as military regimes, since almost all cases of personalist 
regimes rely on the military to maintain power and execute policy. Where Geddes sees 
a strong party apparatus accompanying personal rule, she classifies it as a party- 
personalist hybrid. This lends added confidence that Geddes’ purely personalist 
regimes lack a ruling party that rivals the power of the military. 
The results of this robustness test are displayed in Table A21 and Table A22. 
Regarding military regime emergence, the findings using Geddes et al.’s data are 
nearly identical to our baseline model, both in the pooled and in the fixed effects 
regression. As for democratization, the results are much weaker using the alternative 
measure. While the coefficient of Regional rebellion (decay) is negative throughout, 
it only reaches levels of statistical significance in Table A22, column 4. This 
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underlines the fact that the results for military regime democratization should be 
viewed as suggestive, rather than conclusive.  
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Table A21: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (GWF data) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 1.029 1.023 0.838 0.937 1.944 
 (0.430)** (0.429)** (0.450)* (0.444)** (0.757)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.701 0.699 0.651 0.710 0.857 
 (0.316)** (0.317)** (0.325)** (0.323)** (0.567) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.431 -0.435 -0.606 -0.451 -2.674 
 (0.201)** (0.200)** (0.237)** (0.285) (1.331)** 
Population size (log) t-1 0.043 0.050 -0.108 0.187 2.928 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.148) (0.330) (1.800) 
Polity t-1 -0.131 -0.131 -0.147 -0.146 -0.316 
 (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.050)*** 
Previous failures 0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.157 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.078)** 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.339 -0.265 -0.128 0.444 
  (0.755) (0.743) (0.753) (1.056) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.780 0.806 0.602 
   (0.193)*** (0.184)*** (0.253)** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -0.633 -0.506  
   (0.804) (0.831)  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -7.806 -9.579 
    (7.602) (41.881) 
NxT 4,382 4,382 4,293 4,103 1,183 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A22: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (GWF data) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.333   0.723   
 (0.789)   (0.803)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 -0.356   -0.021   
 (0.489)   (0.437)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  -1.606   -1.701  
  (1.631)   (1.706)  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  -0.838   -0.502  
  (0.607)   (0.556)  
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1   -0.569 -0.953 -0.926 -0.435 
   (0.541) (0.578)* (0.771) (0.929) 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1   -0.980 -0.992 -0.658 -0.826 
   (0.636) (0.622) (0.597) (1.649) 
NxT 1,337 951 1,337 1,337 951 548 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Alternative half-lives for our decaying variables 
To recall, our main variables measuring exposure to rebellions – regional and center-
seeking – are decaying variables with a half-life of one year, meaning that half of the 
effect decays after one year. To see if our findings are driven by this particular choice 
of half-life, we rerun our baseline models with alternative half-lives of two, three, and 
five years respectively. The results, displayed in Table A23-Table A28, are 
substantively identical to our baseline models, albeit slightly weaker in the case of 
military regime democratization with a half-life of five years.  
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Table A23: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (half-life 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1 1.004 1.014 0.898 0.876 2.283 
 (0.436)** (0.432)** (0.423)** (0.409)** (1.027)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1 0.372 0.374 0.293 0.261 1.348 
 (0.371) (0.371) (0.356) (0.360) (0.794)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.151 -0.152 -0.166 0.017 -0.774 
 (0.238) (0.237) (0.233) (0.264) (0.890) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.038 0.041 -0.011 0.367 2.776 
 (0.129) (0.126) (0.125) (0.216)* (2.113) 
Polity t-1 -0.127 -0.128 -0.142 -0.154 -0.408 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.195 0.196 0.165 0.126 -1.136 
 (0.215) (0.216) (0.238) (0.251) (1.003) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.143 0.039 0.370 0.337 
  (0.770) (0.749) (0.742) (1.066) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.482 0.516 -0.098 
   (0.151)*** (0.155)*** (0.310) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.572 -1.685  
   (0.694)** (0.748)**  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.185 -21.722 
    (5.012)** (33.329) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A24: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (half-life 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   2.662   
 (1.190)   (2.030)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -0.482   
 (0.861)   (1.809)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   1.847  
  (0.879)   (2.149)  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.923  
  (1.483)   (1.293)  
Regional rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1   -2.758 -4.340 -1.436 -13.441 
   (1.524)* (1.951)** (2.053) (4.607)*** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL2, decay) t-1   1.866 2.460 1.955 1.090 
   (0.989)* (1.785) (1.086)* (2.333) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A25: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (half-life 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1 0.974 0.983 0.869 0.859 2.350 
 (0.430)** (0.425)** (0.415)** (0.403)** (1.063)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1 0.363 0.366 0.293 0.259 1.474 
 (0.375) (0.375) (0.362) (0.365) (0.833)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.146 -0.147 -0.161 0.023 -0.723 
 (0.238) (0.237) (0.233) (0.265) (0.914) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.038 0.040 -0.012 0.368 2.832 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.126) (0.216)* (2.138) 
Polity t-1 -0.128 -0.128 -0.143 -0.154 -0.409 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.190 0.190 0.160 0.121 -1.177 
 (0.217) (0.217) (0.239) (0.252) (1.010) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.137 0.038 0.369 0.266 
  (0.763) (0.746) (0.740) (1.079) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.485 0.518 -0.099 
   (0.152)*** (0.155)*** (0.315) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.568 -1.680  
   (0.695)** (0.750)**  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.285 -23.936 
    (5.034)** (34.249) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A26: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (half-life 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   3.107   
 (1.190)   (2.096)   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -0.769   
 (0.861)   (2.207)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   0.931  
  (0.879)   (2.894)  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.961  
  (1.483)   (1.290)  
Regional rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1   -2.791 -4.838 -0.529 -14.690 
   (1.565)* (2.045)** (2.733) (15.613) 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL3, decay) t-1   1.872 2.758 2.090 2.548 
   (0.992)* (2.116) (1.124)* (2.387) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A27: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (half-life 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1 0.930 0.938 0.826 0.837 2.381 
 (0.419)** (0.414)** (0.404)** (0.395)** (1.119)** 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1 0.338 0.341 0.281 0.246 1.612 
 (0.382) (0.382) (0.372) (0.375) (0.894)* 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.141 -0.142 -0.157 0.031 -0.659 
 (0.237) (0.237) (0.233) (0.265) (0.945) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.039 0.041 -0.013 0.373 2.862 
 (0.130) (0.128) (0.127) (0.217)* (2.172) 
Polity t-1 -0.128 -0.128 -0.143 -0.155 -0.410 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.096)*** 
Previous failures 0.182 0.183 0.151 0.114 -1.214 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.242) (0.255) (1.011) 
War (dummy) t-1  -0.130 0.034 0.367 0.156 
  (0.751) (0.741) (0.736) (1.087) 
Unrest (log) t-1   0.488 0.520 -0.098 
   (0.152)*** (0.155)*** (0.322) 
Rel. fractionalization t-1   -1.559 -1.671  
   (0.696)** (0.754)**  
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1    -10.482 -26.702 
    (5.076)** (35.579) 
NxT 4,726 4,726 4,631 4,630 1,301 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-4. Conditional logit model in column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A28: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (half-life 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 0.759   3.951   
 (1.190)   (2.284)*   
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 0.844   -1.167   
 (0.861)   (2.944)   
Directly following regional rebellion t-1  0.650   0.011  
  (0.879)   (3.018)  
Directly following center-seeking rebellion t-1  0.029   -0.948  
  (1.483)   (1.296)  
Regional rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1   -2.673 -5.794 0.341 -35.328 
   (1.632) (2.366)** (2.805) (36.325) 
Center-seeking rebellion (HL5, decay) t-1   1.767 3.134 2.185 4.311 
   (0.985)* (2.832) (1.198)* (3.421) 
NxT 1,166 1,023 1,166 1,166 1,023 471 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled logit model in columns 1-5. Conditional logit model in column 6. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Influential observations 
To ensure that our results are not solely driven by a few influential observations, we 
rerun our regressions while dropping observations with particularly high leverage. To 
identify these observations, we are using Pregibon’s dbeta which provides information 
on the influence on parameter estimates of each individual observation. There is no 
critical value for this measure and influential observations have to be identified using 
eyeballing. In light of Figure A7, Pakistan (cowcode770) and Thailand (cowcode 800) 
seem to contain influential observations. Figure A8 highlights Argentina (cowcode 
160) and Greece (cowcode 350) as influential observations. We therefore remove 
these countries from the regression and rerun our baseline models. The results shown 
in Table A29 and Table A30 are substantively identical to our core findings, albeit 
slightly weaker in both cases. We thus conclude that our results are not a pure artefact 
of a few high-leverage observations. 
 
Figure A7: Influential observations for military regime emergence 
 
Note: Labels represent cowcode-years.  
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Figure A8: Influential observations for military regime democratization 
 
Note: Labels represent cowcode-years.  
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Table A29: Regional rebellions and military regime emergence (w/o influential 
observations) 
 (1) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 0.793 
 (0.451)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 0.444 
 (0.363) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 -0.169 
 (0.249) 
Population size (log) t-1 0.330 
 (0.224) 
Polity t-1 -0.144 
 (0.034)*** 
War (dummy) t-1 0.163 
 (0.883) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.562 
 (0.162)*** 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 -1.585 
 (0.755)** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -10.092 
 (5.103)** 
Previous failures -0.089 
 (0.250) 
NxT 4,368 
Time polynomials Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
Pooled logit model replicating column 4, Table 1 in main article, without Pakistan and 
Thailand. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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Table A30: Regional rebellions and military regime democratization (w/o 
influential observations) 
 (1) 
Previously experienced regional rebellion t-1 1.717 
 (2.193) 
Previously experienced center-seeking rebellion t-1 -1.823 
 (1.117) 
Regional rebellion (decay) t-1 -4.259 
 (2.371)* 
Center-seeking rebellion (decay) t-1 2.350 
 (1.484) 
GDP p.c. (log) t-1 0.011 
 (0.854) 
Population size (log) t-1 -0.075 
 (1.059) 
Polity t-1 1.034 
 (0.218)*** 
Mil. capabilities (cube root) t-1 -4.079 
 (20.354) 
Unrest (log) t-1 0.156 
 (0.668) 
War (dummy) t-1 -3.257 
 (1.705)* 
Rel. fractionalization t-1 12.127 
 (3.967)*** 
Number of previous regime failures 0.979 
 (0.521)* 
NxT 1,144 
Time polynomials Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
Pooled logit model replicating column 4, Table 4 in main article, without Argentina 
and Greece. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01 
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